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KUWAITI INTELLECTUALS ON ARAB UNITY

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CHANGE OF DECLARED ARAB OBJECTIVES ADVISED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 7 Dec 80 pp 1, 14

[Article by Dr Muhammad al-Rumayhi: "AL-WATAN Opens Door to Dialogue in Search of Rational Logic for Arab Relations; To Start With, I Ask: What Arabs Do We Mean; How Can We Speak of Unity and Progress When Arab Intellectuals Are Hunted?"]

[Text] Al-WATAN begins today its extensive dialogue "in search of a rational logic for Arab relations." The paper will open its pages to a large select group of Arab writers who will answer questions raised concerning the "Arab action complex" and concerning the vast gap between words and actions.

AL-WATAN presented its questions yesterday and said that despite success in convening a summit conference, there has been, at the same time, absence from the summit and that while there are, despite the conference, those who call for Arab unity or Arab detente, there are also those who call for the acquisition of the latest weapons for inter-Arab confrontations, not for confrontations against the Israeli enemy. The paper also said that while there are those who call for confrontation against Israel, there are also those who call for peace with Israel.

The paper asked: "Isn't the Arab reality, in its present form, a stage for the absurd?"

Before the ink of the edition could dry, Dr Muhammad al-Rumayhi stormed into the discussion and posed a question to AL-WATAN and to the citizens. Dr al-Rumayhi asks in his article: "What Arabs do you mean? The Arabs for peace or the Arabs for confrontation? The oil Arabs or those Arabs who advocate revolution and the overthrow of the regimes?"

In posing his question, the writer has answered a more important question, namely: "Why isn't there a logic and a system that govern Arab action?" Answering frankly, he said: "Because some regimes declare goals in which they do not believe and say what they do not carry out."

This is an interesting discussion that will start today and will last several days during which Arab writers will exchange views on the pages of their paper, AL-WATAN, in serach of rational logic and sound thinking in the hope... Intellectuals must move ahead of the politicians and the decision makers must hear what the thinkers say.

[Text of al-Rumayhi article] Can we depict and understand the present Arab reality in isolation from the surrounding international facts? Is the change in inter-Arab relations independent of the relations of the Arabs with the world powers, especially the two superpowers? What about the social content of this or that state and about its economic and political structures? All these are factors that determine our undertanding of the Arab reality, and they are intricate internal and external factors in the era of neo-imperialism.

Prior to answering the aforementioned questions, it is also important to make a reading of the Arab ideology, namely Arab nationalism, emerging after World War I and developing and assuming several forms since then. From the outset, the Arab national movement was born out of a confrontation with the more comprehensive framework prevailing until World War I, namely the Islamic Ottoman state. This conflict emanated from the fact that the Arabs saw weakness and feebleness afflicting the Islamic Ottoman State and thought that their unity as Arabs would enable them to adopt means for development and progress. However, the colonialist West, which had been painting a rosy picture for the Arabs' independence from the Turks from the outset, was actually planning to subordinate the Arabs to its control and its interests. This is what actually happened and the united Arab state which had constituted hope and aspiration never came into existence. Instead of that state, there emerged various and conflicting entities, each of which wanted to retain its form. Arbitrary borders were drawn up between the various parts of the Arab homeland. Here, various opinions appeared, such as "super nationalism," if we may use the expression, or provincial regionalism, along with the continued presence of the seed of the Islamic concept and of various opinions within some of those entities. Local and international interests began, and continue to bolster each other at times and to fight one another at other times, thus obstructing the major goal of Arab unity--a goal which has not been achieved and which, it seems, will not be achieved. On the contrary, the slogan of Arab unity seems to have been used to ridicule the Arab masses, considering that mergers, direct unions and federal bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral unions were declared only to fall a few months after their declaration. This is why Arab unity or any union between two Arab countries no longer evokes the same national feelings that it used to evoke in the past.

It seemed at other times that the socio-political content of a given regime in a given Arab country is the most important condition for realizing unity. This is why the objective conditions for the realization of this goal have disappeared due to the absence of this content.

Another goal of Arab nationalism was the goal of confronting Israel. After the 1973 war and its consequences, it seems as if this goal has become impossible. Before 1973, the question of whether to confront Israel through peaceful action or through fedayeen action was the subject of disagreement and the opinions on it varied. But after 1973, the goal in its entirety was dropped and replaced by the goal of restoration of the territories occupied in 1967. This development was followed by the establishment of peace with Israel. Therefore, it is not far from the truth to say that the slogan of confronting Israel is just a propaganda slogan at present on the part of many Arab regimes and a slogan that means nothing at the practical level. Therefore, it is wrong to imagine that there is minimum agreement on Arab action this point.

As for talk about raising the Arab people's standard [of living] and about development, it is also deceptive because develpment, as defined by third world and Arab thinkers, is comprehensive economic, social, political, and cultural development. What we witness on the Arab arena at present is economic growth, and not development in the comprehensive sense.

Moreover, there actually exists a clear political approach of muzzling mouths and of hunting down the Arab citizen who wants to express his opinion, even in foreign capitals of the world. As for physical and moral liquidation, it has become evident to all. Therefore, in this state of division, the Arab regimes have not been able to carry out this development. Growth yes, but no development.

All this leads us to another question, namely: To what degree can agreement be reached on a logic and a system of action that governs Arab relations?

It is evident from previous experience and from modern history that there is no logic and no system of action governing inter-Arab relations. (It is paradoxical that there is a logic and a system of action that govern an Arab country's relations with a non-Arab country).

Why isn't there logic and a system to govern Arab action? Because there are declared goals in which many of the ruling Arab authorities do not believe. These authorities say something at meetings and on official occasions and renounce it afterwards. Therefore, it is more beneficial at this stage to reach agreement on and to define less disputable goals, including: reexamining the issue of unity and considering whether it is possible to replace the slogan of unity by another slogan that is easier to relize and considering whether it is possible to replace the slogan of liberating the Arab territories by the slogan of setting up a Palestinian state on part of Palestine's soil.

These discussions require the regimes to have moral and political courage and require, first of all, regimes that are confident of their peoples, i.e. regimes established with the approval of all the people. It seems that these conditions are not present in many current Arab regimes. It also seems that many leaders lack the courage to set goals other than those already declared. Therefore, the easiest solution is to resort to intensive propaganda concerning the conventional aspirations of liberation, development and progress, and nothing beyond.

Finally, when we talk of reaching a strategic agreement on what the Arabs want as a minimum, we ask: What Arabs do we mean? Are they the Palestinian Arabs who want to liberate the land? Are they the Egyptian Arabs--the official regime--who want peace with Israel and internal development financed by the oil Arabs? Are they the oil Arabs who perhaps want the internal situation to stay as is so that they may avoid troubles, upheavals and so forth? Are they the revolutionary Arabs who want to overthrow the regimes they do not like?

To conclude, any observer can say that the manifestations of Arab disagreement are [a reflection of] the dynamic nature of civilizational totality or the dialectics of the desired progress. From a different viewpoint, these manifestations emanate, therefore, from the vitality of a nation that wants to map out for itself a path

of progress. In the sphere of the present international politics, there is no area in the world that contains as many political, economic and cultural agreements and conflicts as the Arab area. What we are witnessing at present on the Arab arena is a great labor which will then give birth to something new, compatible with the aspirations of the Arab nation's masses. Perhaps some people's boycott of this recent summit conference that was held in Amman is the sign of the end of this kind of policy (summit conference) and the start of a new kind of relations. Therefore, it is wrong to view the current phase as a phase of endless turbulence. It is no more than a controversial link in the Arab reality.

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CHANGE IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIPS' RELATIONS WITH MASSES SEEN NECESSARY

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 8 Dec 80 pp 1, 9

[Article by Tawfiq Abu-Bakr: "Leadership and Masses, This Is Problem"]

[Text] Since the political independence of the Arab countries, there have been endeavors to find--through trial and error--various paths for more advanced Arab relations, beginning with coordination, attempts at gradual unity and at a well-studied unity and ending with complete unity. The history of Arab unionist action in its various forms throughout the past decades supplies us with ample examples of both negative aspects and positive accomplishments through which to explore the future spheres of common Arab action without the need to dwell on many of the theorectical issues that have been tested by events and turned into facts belonging to Arab political history.

In the early 1950's, numerous Arab leaderships in various Arab countries fell, due to pan-Arab and regional reasons: the failure to manage an effective and successful struggle against Zionism which had occupied a part of the Arab Palestine and social and political reasons embodied in the subservience of those defunct regimes to colonialism against the will and interest of the broadest popular sectors in their countries.

Nasirism, which developed itself and its concepts through trial and error and which was embodied in 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership, led a constantly growing Arab axis calling for "unity of goal" as an alternative to the slogan "unity of ranks" for which the Arab League has been and continues to be the tangible embodiment. For more than a decade, this Nasirist bloc believed that the national goal of liberating Palestine could be realized only through unity, and thus the slogan "unity is the path to Palestine" emerged, thunderous and roaring, and enchanted the Arab masses. The bloc also believed that unity can be realized only among political regimes that are relatively similar in the nature of their government and of their slogans (the bloc disregarded totally the level of economic and social development in each country and the degree of its similarity to the other country).

This bloc put its theses to the test in more than one Arab unification endeavor. Colonialism and its supporters confronted those attempts because of the objective danger they posed to their interests and buried them one after the other.

In the mid-1960's, the story of diverting the Jordan River tributaries started, along with a general decline in the slogans of "polarization, unity of the goal and the path to Jerusalem is across the Arab capitals," for objective and subjective reasons that require a separate study.

Through his political theoreticians, led by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, 'Abd-al-Nasir launched a large-scale human campaign to move toward joint Arab action under the slogan of "unity of ranks" and of "minimal unity" to confront an imminent Zionist danger threatening all--both progressives and conservatitives--and not waiting for the occurrence of the desired revolutionary changes sought by advocates of "unity of ranks" to embark on a successful and fundamental struggle against both Zionism and colonialism at the same time. The first summit conference to encounter an imminent danger threatening all convened in 1964 to discuss, as we all know, the means to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River tributaries.

The June [1967] defeat and its direct catastrophic consequences were tantamount to an indefinite halt to any talk beyond action for "unity of ranks" in order to eliminate the traces of the aggression. Arab summit conferences were held in succession on the basis of agreement on the minimal--collective--joint action and of developing the means of Arab unionist action in the various economic, cultural and other spheres to attain Arab integration in the age of giant blocs in this world.

Even the unification attempts taking place in the 1970's between a number of Arab countries were not characterized by "polarization" and by large-scale propaganda offensives against the so-called "conservatives," unlike the attempts of the 1950's and 1960's. Moreover, the endeavors of the 1970's paid greater attention, regardless of the slogans, to the questions of economic integration and joint building through industrial, agricultural and service projects which were announced at the time, some of which have been implemented.

The gist of it all is that action under the slogan of "unity of ranks" and of "Arab solidarity" is the belief most widely adopted by the Arab political leaderships despite the limited return in comparison to the great ultimate goals and to the broad dimensions of the challenge.

Therefore, the Arab path abounds with numerous hard and bitter questions:

Cannot agreement be reached on the supreme objectives, such as liberation of the land and the realization of the prosperity for our peoples?

Why don't the Arabs carry out what they agree on? Why do regional conflicts rise and overwhelm every national interest? How can the minimum-limit strategy be secured against political upheavals and storms?

Through a careful examination of these questions and accusations and of numerous other questions that continue in the form of whispers and hints, one notices that many of us substitute their subjective wishes and their fond aspirations for stubborn, objective reality, and this is natural. When they discover, and how frequently they do, the great gap between reality and hope, they are afflicted with frustration and despair, and this is exactly what the enemies of Arab progress wish.

In the realitie and conflicts of life, there is nothing that cannot be interpreted. Preludes can only lead to results similar to and compatible with the preludes.

If we may move from the general to the particular, we can underline the following observations:

There are minimal goals adopted by the Arab summit conferences since the October war. These goals are embodied clearly in efforts to force Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967, especially Jerusalem, and in efforts to realize the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights as defined by the PLO and to set up a Palestinian national state under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Some call these goals "the phased Arab strategy" on the grounds that this strategy has numerous goals and that these are some of its goals in a certain phase and in a certain sphere.

Some believed, and perhaps continue to believe, that salvation is embodied in the agreement over the "goals" and that all there remains [to be agreed upon] are the means. Here, in my opinion, lies one of the real problems facing Arab solidarity. Agreement on general goals means nothing if the specific means that make it possible to realize the goals are not defined and if the tangible instruments that shoulder the responsibility of applying and following up on the means, of examining whatever breaks down and of searching for immediate solutions to transient problems are not defined.

In this regard, it is useless for all the thinkers and intellectuals to embark on an ambitious moral appeal to Arab officials to carry out what they agree upon if the means and instruments are not clear and are not fully mobilized in the desired direction. The Egyptian regime is still capable of misleading large sectors of the Arab "minimal" goals which are summed up in withdrawal and realization of the Palestinian people's rights and into the belief that this regime is only in disagreement with the others over the means in instruments which were not (and could no not have been) defined by Arab consensus.

Some Arabs still believe that they are working for the some [minimal] goals through establishing friendship with the United States so that it may one day exert its pressures on Israel for withdrawal when a strong man who places the US "national and strategic" interests safely out of reach of the domestic Zionist pressures gets to occupy the White House (perhaps King Husayn's statements to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI a few days ago reflect an understanding in this direction).

Some Arabs, represented in the steadfastness and confrontation states, believe (to varying degrees) that a strategic balance must be established with the enemy (because this is a precondition for any balanced solution, be it peaceful or by war) and that the firmest relations must be established with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc countries because a clear definition must be made of the hostile and friendly camps amidst the ongoing conflict and amidst all the direct and indirect parties involved.

Consequently, the means are the basis and the real touchstone and no move can be made from "the strategy of position to the strategy of action," as a prominent Palestinian official has called it, or from the state of reaction to the state of "initiative and action" unless the means and the instruments are defined.

The means and the instruments are tied to each other. Singing the praises of armed struggle as a sole means to realize goals turns into deception unless a sound democratic atmosphere is created to give all capabilities the opportunity to contribute and all political, professional and popular institutions the opportunity to grow without any custodianship so that they may become the instruments capable of carrying the goal and of fighting for it.

There can be no talk about a new logic for Arab relations unless a qualitative change takes place in the relations of the political leaderships of each country with their masses.

Any person with a reasonable degree of political education and political interest can define easily a number of conditions that can secure Arab agreements against the political upheavals and storms. Contemporary Arab political life has abounded with countless studies in this regard (the most sedate being the studies issued by the Arab Unity Studies Center). However, these studies are studies with a propaganda and mobilizational value and studies that remain within the general emotional framework.

Finally, the broad sectors of any people shoulder the responsiblity of making the future through small accomplishments that accumulate gradually, passing through countless twists, turns and upheavals but forging ahead ultimately. This is history's objective direction.

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UNIFICATION THROUGH DEMOCRATIC POPULAR ACTION UNDERLINED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 9 Dec 80 pp 1, 11

[Article by Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih: "Beginning in Egypt, But When Will Egypt Return"]

[Text] In one of the Arab summit conferences that I attended as part of the press delegation accompanying the official Kuwaiti delegation, a prominent Kuwaiti official asked me: Hasn't the large number of guards accompanying the Arab heads of state drawn your attention? I answered succinctly: I have rather been thinking that if each Arab head of state brought a number of economic and political experts instead of the security men, the conference would be able to emerge with resolutions and recommendations in the interest of the Arab nation. But the problem is that most of the Arab heads of state give more thought to the security issues than to the issues of economic and social development. I don't imagine that most of the Arab leaders are capable of replacing the security men by experts for a simple reason, namely that most of them have assumed power in an abnormal manner. Consequently, their first task is to inject legitimacy into this abnormal situation. This is done by putting loyalty ahead of capability. This is why we find that the aides and retinue of an Arab ruler are comprised of those who are skillful at flattering the ruler and those who benefit from his presence. The same applies to state agencies, unions and professional associations where rigged elections are conducted so that the leader's "men" may win. The same also goes for the state institutions which turn into token institutions whose task is to glorify and sing the Arab ruler's praises. Capabilities that are not skillful at currying favors with the Arab leader are compelled to move out of their homeland. This is why we hear that the Arab capabilities live in the United States and Europe because they are not good at flattering the ruler. This abnormal situation and this flaw from which most of the Arab regimes suffer obstruct the people's capabilities and press the state agencies to defend the regime. In view of the fact that each regime has its own opinion, then the possibility of disagreement is considered natural. These disagreements between the regimes may lead to wars, especially since some regimes resort to this course to bolster their weak domestic positions because it is well known that the best means to rally the people behind any regime is to create external battles in which the citizen is preoccupied with defending his homeland, thus forgetting his disagreements with his regime.

It may be said: If this is the case, then why haven't the Arab regimes exploited Israel's existence in the heart of the Arab homeland to create battles with it.

The answer to this question is simple, namely that the economic, political and social structures of the Arab states are not prepared to fight an enemy who has been able to realize in his society some kind of a political and economic democracy that doesn't exist in the Arab states. These structures cannot achieve self-realization through the fragmented political and economic entities. No economic development can be realized in an Arab country in isolation from the other Arab countri s because the Arab entities are integrated economicially and socially. Therefc ., their element of strength emanates from their unity or unification. Such unity or unification are impossible as a result of the thinking and courses of the Arab regimes, considering that each regime has created economic interests for a minority, has created political borders and has resorted to singing the praises of regional glories. Therefore, the Arab states are, because of their fragmentation, incapable of confronting Israel with 22 entities, 22 peoples and with a similar number of economic programs and plans and social policies whereas God has created this area as a geographically and economically united area and an area with the same language, aspirations and pains. However, the interests of the minority in most of the Arab countries cause the regimes to create out of each entity a self-contained nation, an independent civilization and armies, to spend on weapons to protect them and to pay commissions [graft] to the minority. Therefore, the act required primarily is unification or, I must say, a return to our characteristic as an Arab nation and as a single geographic and historical unity with a single economy and a single policy. The act of unification is not carried out by the Arab regimes and cannot be realized through summit conferences or through resolutions from above because if unity--in its capacity as a popular goal--means equality between the Arab countries, then it also means, among other things, equality within each society. Therefore, unity must be realized through democratic action, both politically and economically, because the presence of parliaments and elections cannot be imagined when the citizen is still seeking proper food and housing, decent clothing and future security. Political democracy without the realization of economic justice for the citizens means the triumph of the rich minority. The Arab society will thus live like the US society with its people represented only by the rich who are capable of controlling the propaganda media through enormous budgets. This is why the US society has realized political democracy without economic justice, as evidenced by the social injustice suffered by a large sector of the poor people, such as the blacks. Perhaps this is what causes the US society, which has attained a degree of material and cultural progress, to suffer from the highest crime rate. Therefore, the solution to the fragmentation and aimlessness from which the Arab society suffers lies in realizing the democratic Arab unity and not in the unities that come from above or through a political decision that begins only to end in a few months or perhaps days, that is if it begins at all. Perhaps the failure of the unity experiments undergone by our Arab homeland are the best proof that needs no further demonstration.

But how can the democratic Arab unity, with both its political and economic aspects, be realized? Are the Arab regimes capable of realizing this unity? The answer does not require great effort. He who lacks something cannot give it and most of the Arab regimes have not come into existence democratically and have not realized economic justice in their society. Therefore, we do not expect them to realiz- that which is in conflict with their nature. The question of how the democratic unification is realized continues, therefore, to be present.

I imagine that the change may occur in an Arab state with the power of polarization. When I consider the Arab states, I find none other than Egypt with its civilization of thousands of years, with its 50 million people, with its central African position between Asia and Europe and with its [high] rate of educated and experts, capable of performing this role. Egypt alone is capable of playing the vanguard role in the unification process. This is why I believe that Egypt's estrangement from Arabism is only temporary. Perhaps this is a lesson for us and for Egypt. Had not Egypt pulled away, the Lebanese war and the border wars in the Arab homeland would not have occurred and this internal division in every Arab country would not have happened. Therefore, Egypt's return to the Arab entity is a goal on which the efforts must be focused. Fortunately for the Arabs, the Egyptian people's vanguards are leading the struggle inside Egypt and are capable, with the sympathy and aid of the Arab people, to effect a change so that Egypt may resume its natural and vanguard role and may lead a democratic pan-Arab struggle for the unity in which Israel has no existence. The change process for which Egypt is equipped should not come through the military because this kind of change is rejected. It should come through democratic popular action. The Arab Egyptian people, in solidarity with the Arab people in the other Arab countries, are capable of bringing about this change. Perhaps the collapses occurring in most of the Arab countries are the prelude for a comprehensive Arab awakening.

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NATIONAL MOVEMENT FORCES URGED TO CAST ASIDE DIFFERENCES

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Dec 80 pp 1, 19

[Article by Dr As'ad 'Abd-al-Rahman, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences and Chief Editor of AL-'ULUM AL-IJTIMA'IYAH [Social Sciences] Magazine in University of Kuwait; "Now That We Have Failed to Convene Comprehensive Arab Summit, Arab National Forces Should Hold Their Own Summit"]

[Text] When "searching for a rational logic for the Arab relations" in the current phase, we have to go back to the past. Such a return does not emanate from a predominant inclination "to dig up graves" nor from the inclination to "escape to the past" but from a basic premise to the effect that to understand the present and explore the future, a return to the past is necessary. In other words, it is an inclination derived from the certain conviction on the need to return to the past and to evaluate its bygone theories and experiences with the aim of employing them to understand the present and to approach the future and draw up its "wise" lines.

This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, the word "rational" is a word that is constantly subject to the ideological position of each party. What is "rational" for one group is "madness" itself for another and what is "rational" for one faction is "flight of the imagination" for another. Moreover, the call for reason or for rationality may mean to some a mere call for preserving what is in existence or for abolishing what is necessary in favor of what is possible. Therefore, it must be acknowledged in advance that what is rational for some is completely irrational for others and vice versa.

If we move from the general to the particular, we find that the talk about the Arab relations requires dealing with these relations at the Arab popular level and the Arab official level. Concerning the latter, the Arab official relations have undergone so far four distinctive historical phases in which they have tried to search for a "rational logic" through various forms of cooperation:

Form of Contractual Coordination and Cooperation:

To put it very briefly, this form was embodied in the creation of the Arab League. It was also characterized by comprehensiveness, contrary to the other forms, from

the angle of the fact that it included the then existing 7 Arab states. In view of the difference between those states, the Arab League format came as a loose [munfalishah] format which entrenched the "logic" of the separate political entities and of the sovereignty of each of those entities. Therefore, it was natural for that era's nationalists to feel disappointed by the League because it strengthened the regional tendency at the expense of the pan-Arab tendency under the canopy of an international atmosphere (Britain, basically) supporting the regional tendency. Despite this, this form has succeeded throughout the years, as a result of the Zionist event fundamentally, in realizing a minimal degree of preserving the pan-Arab entity of the Arab states founding it and joining it since then. The League has also succeeded through its functional cooperative activity (in the sphere of the various political conferences, of the specialized agencies and of cooperation treaties in the economic, cultural, social and other fields) in developing awareness of the need for mutual Arab cooperation and for the coordination of policies. This most enduring contractual form has, within its modest limits, survived until the present.

Form of Incomprehensive and Ideological Unity

In addition to the Arab League and as a result of the fact that this League failed to realize the maximum aspirations of the Arab national movement and of its influential forces in the 1950's, there emerged the forms of multilateral and incomprehensive unity (or unities). Contrary to the Arab League form, these forms were based on the slogan that the interests and aspirations of the Arab political entities were neither harmonious nor concordant. This is why the formats of bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral unity emerged, such as Egypt's actual union with Syria in 1958, Jordan's union with Iraq in 1958, Egypt, Syria's and Yemen's superficial union in 1959 and the plans for Syria's and Iraq's union in 1963, for Egypt's, Syria's and Libya's union in 1971 and the Syrian-Libyan union in 1980, not to mention the format of the Pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and other projects. These forms have also been accompanied with the crystallization of the more fundamental popular movements that have aligned themselves with the official radical axis at the expense of the official conservative axis. This polarization has led to an international development causing the radical axis to rush toward stronger relations with the Soviet Union and the opposing axis to rush toward firmer relations with the United States. Thus, the form of partial unity or of partial unity plans between the entities with similar ideologies has replaced the form of comprehensive unity among the entities with different ideologies.

Revolutionary Socialist Form

As a result of the failure of the previous two forms (the comprehensive contractual and the partial ideological [unity] forms) and in the wake of the 1967 defeat, there emerged in the Arab homeland--at an extremely limited official level and broad unofficial popular level--the form of unity based on the concept of socialism which could no longer see any possibility for meeting between the political entities with different ideologies or for any meeting between most of these entities (including the petit bourgeois regimes) on the one hand and the progressive national forces calling for unity on the other hand. This inclination was widespread among the "old" and "new" leftist forces, especially when the 1967 war, its immediate consequences and its subsequent developments led to the "Marxisization"

of some nationalists and (pan-Arabization) of some Marxists. All this occurred within an atmosphere of growing conviction that the conflict in the area is not a conflict between the Arab nationalism and the "Israeli nationalism" alone but is also a conflict tied organically to the international confrontation between the two camps of capitalism and socialism. However, the glow of this projection dimmed after the partial defeats and failures suffered by the advocates of this current (including the Palestinian resistance which grew after 1967) and as a result of the temporary glow of a new form which developed with the 1967 war.

Form of Functional non-Ideological Cooperation

This new form was based on the functional unification of the Arab entities as a prelude for a stronger unity and for replacement of the aforementioned ideologies by the ideology of development, if we may use the expression. This projection gained temporary momentum when the different Arab regimes succeeded in coordinating their policies before and during the October 1973 war on the basis that some of them perform the military task and others perform the economic (oil, fundamentally) task. But this form degenerated and ended rapidly as a result of the subsequent developments (the Egyptian-Syrian disagreement on the eve of the end of the 1973 war, the disengagement agreements on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts in 1973 and 1975, replacement of the Egyptian-Soviet alliance by the Egyptian-US alliance, al-Sadat's trip to Israel, the Camp David accords, the bilateral peace, the normalization and so forth).

Since then, attempts have continued to be made along the lines of the aforementioned four forms. The Arab League has continued, despite moving from Cairo to Tunis, there have been successive Arab summits in Baghdad and Amman, the multilateral and incomprehensive unions, such as the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and Syrian-Libyan unity plan, continue and the revolutionary unionist projection on the part of the national, democratic and progressive Arab forces and movements continues to be present, especially through the Arab People's Congresses. But the most prominent characteristic of this phase is embodied in the mixture and the simultaneous presence of these four inclinations without the predominance of any single inclination on the one hand and with the intensified Arab official division and unofficial division (among the parties forming the popular national movement) under the impact of the US-Israeli-Sadatist onslaught on the other hand.

All the forms of official unionist action have proven their failure to realize their desired goals as a result of the difference in the official positions--a difference which has made the agreement on a minimal program a temporary and unstable agreement.

Despite this failure, these forms have succeeded in realizing subsidiary accomplishments here and there, depending on the sphere of their action and activity. These forms will continue to be present and to compete for a long time. Moreover, there is no harm in their continued presence, provided that the Arab unionist action is not confined to them. There is no harm in the convocation of Arab summits because such summits, even if they fail to formulate and implement a complete strategy, achieve partial success at the level of freezing or solving bilateral conflicts or other conflicts between the Arab states. They also succeed partially, like the Baghdad summit, in preventing an Arab collapse without being

able, of course, to achieve Arab salvation. These Arab summits will continue to be an edifice whose ceiling is not as high as the Arab aspirations. Perhaps the flagrant recent division (over the Arab summit in Amman and over the Iraq-Iran war) in both the official and unofficial Arab positions deserves, from the angle of its impact on the morale of the Arab masses at least, a calm pause. This is the inlet to the answer to the question "what is to be done"--an answer based on the limited scope of the Arab official action on the one hand and the unlimited scope of the popular Arab action on the other hand. What is intended here is to recall the outcome of these unionist forms at both the official and Arab [sic] levels and to observe their impact on the Arab popular situation. Only then will the features of the future be determined.

Arab Popular Relations

Since the emergence of the political entities in the Arab homeland, we have been witnessing the conflict and the interfighting among these entities, despite their temporary solidarity at times. With the increasing number of these entitites throughout the past half century, particularly in the past quarter century, the degree of difference, conflict and interfighting has intensified. All this has been natural and understandable. At times and according to certain criteria, it has even been required. Therefore, as they have been pained by the interfighting, the peoples have at times felt optimistic about it. Exactly as they felt revived at times by the rise of the winds of the "cold Arab war" between the Arab political entities or as they felt delighted by the drumbeats of the "hot war" between the Arab political entities in some stages, the same peoples have at other times felt cheated by the Arab relaxation and solidarity achieved through comprehensive, limited or other kinds of summits. As a result of all of this--the failure of the interfighting to realize its goal on the one hand and the failure of solidarity to achieve its goals on the other hand--despair has begun to infiltrate broad sectors of the Arab nation. Perhaps this result, in addition to its being one of the strategic goals of imperialism and its allies, has constituted the window through which imperialism has returned to us after being forced by the Arab peoples to get out through the door.

Attempts at Spreading Despair

But the mixed feelings of joy and pain amidst the Arab masses vis-a-vis the Arab official interfighting or solidarity have not been altogether the most decisive factor in the efforts seeking to spread despair among the peoples. This is because the mixed feelings have, as a result of pain, created frustration at times and, as a result of joy, optimism at others. Thus, the masses have retained a moderate degree of immunity to the disease of despair aimed against them.

The more decisive and, naturally, the unintentional factor that has contributed to spreading despair among the masses is due, both in past and at present, to difference, conflict and interfighting between the Arab national, democratic and progressive movements, parties and individuals. The interfighting among these forces escalated in the 1960's in comparison to the 1950's when relatively friendly and non-belligerent feelings prevailed. Even though the basic lesson learned by these forces at the outset of the 1970's was to the effect that their interfighting constitutes a catastrophe beyond all catastrophes (to each one of them separately

and to all of them collectively), the end of the 1970's witnessed a return to that interfighting. Here we are in the 1980's and the interfighting has, under the canopy of the atmosphere of the Iraq-Iran war, exceeded all imagination.

The current interfighting is very serious and if the accounts are not reexamined quickly, this interfighting may even by the "criminal bullet" that will kill all remaining hope among the masses. The current interfighting is a disease in whose service real weapons have been employed (at least in Lebanon). All the ideological, organizational and political weapons possessed by the interfighting forces have also been employed. This interfighting is, moreover, taking place in the atmosphere of the serious current interfighting among the Arab political entities, most of which have had and continue to have an interest in pouring oil on the fire of the disagreements among the Arab national, democratic and progressive forces. Thus, the tent sheltering these forces has been torn as a result of the exchange of bullets and rockets, at least in Lebanon, exactly as it has been torn by the arrows of the accusations which these forces have been hurling at each other throughout the Arab arena. What is more, a quick review of the literature and press of these forces in the past 2 weeks reveals clearly that these accusations are comprehensive and that they spare no party, movement, organization or individual. Therefore, if any member of this nation chooses to believe what the Arab national, progressive and democratic forces themselves say about each other, then he will emerge with the distinct impression that all the organizations, parties, movements and individuals belonging to these forces are agents (of foreign intelligence agencies or of the Arab states), opportunists, compromisers, social climbers and on and on to the end of this discordant tune.

Nature of Phase

We understand that this phase is a phase of national and democratic liberation, we understand that all the Arab national, progressive and democratic forces are original partners in this liberation and we understand that it is beneficial to these forces to be different and to compete. But at the same time, we cannot understand why this phase should be a phase of conflict and interfighting between the Arab national, progressive and democratic forces. This phase is certainly a phase for solidarity among these forces and not a phase for separating these forces because it is a phase for separating these forces from their common enemies. This is how this phase should be.

Without fear, dread or apologies for the accusation of "compromise" which many nowadays welcome as long as the compromise is between these national, democratic and progressive forces and not between these forces and their enemies, out of concern for the Arab cause and its national forces, out of mercy for the masses and out of the desire to keep despair away from them, all these forces must rally and hold a comprehensive meeting or bilateral meetings that open the door for full agreement.

Urgent Talk

There remains an important issue, namely the Iraq-Iran war, and the question "what is to be done?" The Iraq-Iran war has opened the door wide for the answer to the question of "what is to be done" to overcome the present Arab official and

unofficial crisis. The war has led, among other things, to intensifying the Arab official and popular positions. It has even put the popular forces in particular on the turning point of sifting which always has its serious positive and negative consequences. To develop the positive results and minimize the negative ones, there is no harm in our aspiring to transform the negative into the positive within the rule of "crisis, intensify in order to relax," especially among the factions of the Arab national movement. This can be realized only through the convocation of a comprehensive meeting for the Arab national movement's factions so that they may say what they have to say on the fateful Arab issues. Such a meeting must proceed from two fundamental points: First, all the national movement factions, without exclusion and despite the conviction among its parties that the others are in the wrong, are national factions concerned with the supreme interest of the Arab nation, regardless of their different opinions on the Iraq-Iran war and on other issues. Second, this war should be the first and most important point on the agenda of these forces because it serves no interest to act as if the war, which has been going on for more than 2 months, has not taken place or as if it can be ignored. Even though the progressive pan-Arab consideration and the common secular considerations among these forces require them to take a pause of solidarity with Iraq, its people and its legitimate national and pan-Arab rights without undermining the Iranian regional rights, this desired fundamental position may, for considerations pertaining to the current disagreement among the Arab national forces, require the bilateral, multilateral or comprehensive meeting among these forces to focus on two questions concerning the minimal goals and the maximal goals.

The minimal goal of such a meeting should be to answer the strategic question: How do we put an end to the Iraq-Iran war in accordance with a formula that guarantees the legitimate rights of Iraq and of the Arab nation primarily and fundamentally and that preserves Iran's dignity on the basis of establishing new relations with it that serve the interests of the Arab peoples and of the Iranian peoples? The maximal goal of this meeting should be to answer the strategic question:

How can we hasten, after a long delay, to support Iraq in the next phase if it is impossible to put an end to the war as a result of the Iranian leadership's rejection, and perhaps absence?

It has become evident that one or more than one of the national, democratic and progressive forces must take the initiative to call for this meeting. Moreover, this meeting must have the slogan of "now, now and not tomorrow." Let the final hour of such a meeting be the hour of sorting [al-farz], if it becomes obvious that such sorting is necessary. But if no side is capable of taking the initiative for holding and completing such a meeting, then how can the Arab citizen have confidence in the ability of this or that force in realizing any of the strategic goals with which these forces have been promising the masses for so long?

But for the Arab national, progressive and democratic forces to continue to dwell o on their disagreements and to continue to elevate these disagreements to the level of conflicts and, consequently, to push them toward ideological, propaganda and military (at least in Lebanon) confrontation and interfighting is something that leads, despite the good intentions, to pouring water into the mill of the imperialist scheme in the area. To avoid this, an immediate stop must be put to the

the campaign of accusations in whose slaughterhouse almost all of the "sacred cows" in which we have believed for more than 30 years area about to be butchered and the campaign in which the qualities of patriotism and nationalism are about to be stripped from all the strugglers affiliated with any of these Arab national, pan-Arab, democratic and progressive forces. Let all understand that the common ground on which all these forces stand, despite the mistakes of some of these forces is acceptable and that rivalry among them is rejected. Now and in light of the inability to hold a comprehensive summit for the Arab states, the Arab national forces must move quickly to hold their own summit. Unless this occurs, and quickly too, the masses are not to be blamed if they lose their confidence in most of the national movement's factions as they have lost their confidence in most of the existing Arab political entities.

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INTEGRATION, DEMOCRACY VIEWED AS MEANS FOR STRENGTHENING ARAB TIES

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 13 Dec 80 pp 1, 9

[Article by Dr Yahya Fayiz al-Haddad, Professor of Political Sciences at University of Kuwait: "Do Not Be Deceived Because Not Every Arab Action Is Pan-Arab"]

[Text] AL-WATAN continues today publishing the important dialogue "in search of a rational logic for the Arab relations." AL-WATAN continues to receive numerous articles and opinions from politicians, experts and readers. Today, Dr Yahya al-Haddad, the professor of political sciences at the university, presents his viewpoint.

In this phase during which the Arab relations are living in an atmosphere of tension and crisis and at a time when many of us are unable to explain the events taking place on the Arab arena and the relations resulting from them, everybody is wondering about the fate of Arab solidarity and about what common Arab action can realize. This is the same question raised whenever an armed conflict or confrontation erupts between two Arab countries or whenever the Arab nation and its governments experience differences of opinion on fateful national political matters.

Goal Is Clear...But How?

Perhaps no two loyal people in the Arab homeland disagree on the goals and objectives of the Arab struggle which are embodied in the establishment of the united state and the democratic society in which social justice is realized after liberation of the usurped Arab territories. But they will disagree in their answer to the question on how to realize these goals.

Dr 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah believes that the problem of method is almost distorting the great goals for which the Arab people are struggling. The struggle for liberation is taking place with the method of tyrannizing the strugglers to the point where people almost come to hate that freedom which the tyrants use as a pretext. The struggle for unity is taking place with the method of the exploitative regionalism to the point where people have almost come to hate that unity imposed by the regionalists. The struggle for a better life is taking place with the method of dictatorial oppression to the point where people have almost come to hate that social justice of socialism that imposes on them the oppression of the rulers.

All of this is almost about to push the Arab people toward a deadend and toward an advanced stage of despair that paralyzes their movement and that shakes their self-confidence. The Arab people no longer pay attention to the promises of freedom issuing from the mouths of tyrants and the promises of unity with which the regionalists brag. However, this must not lead to backing down of the efforts to realize the national goals and should not lead to acknowledging defeat and handing over the Arab nation's fates to the hands of its enemies. A halt in the struggle procession is tantamount to the inability to move ahead but backing down on the goals is tantamount to an unforgivable defeat.

We have to ask: Is there anything to justify this despair or to impose such a halt on the struggle procession? This history of people is an endless chain of success and failure. Many peoples encountered failure before they could find their way toward progress. If we do not possess the method that leads us to success in realizing our national goals, then we have to double our efforts to determine this method. When we get to know the method, then we must abide by it and adhere to its requirements.

Theory of Method

The theory of method is extremely simple. For example, Dr 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah believes that all that we are required to do is to accept dealing with the objective laws which inevitably control the movement of things and of phenomena. This requires us to stop those idealistic endeavors embodied in imposing our whims on the objective reality and requires us to have a course to which we adhere. As long as the movement of societies and their development is subject to inevitable laws that are known or that can be known, then knowing these laws and the conditions for efficiency is essential for changing the social reality. If we do this at the level of the Arab reality, what do we find?

To start with, fragmentation. The strategy of fragmentation in the Arab homeland, based on creating and protecting fragmentation and on providing it with all the means of continuation and survival, constitutes the essence of the strategy hostile to the Arab aspirations. This hostile strategy emanates from an important axiomatic fact, namely that fragmentation of the Arab homeland, if it continues, is capable by itself of causing any Arab effort for liberation, progress or democracy to be a wasted and stunted effort.

If we may say, and as some people believe, that the political and legal forms of states in most societies are ultimately nothing but the reflection of the classist production relations and are meant to protect the interests of the predominant or prevalent classes, then we encounter in the Arab homeland a completely different, and even largely inverse, situation. Here we find that the basis is the political entity with its limits, its framework and its internal structure. As for the dominant classes, and even the political relations, they came later to protect and entrench these political entities and not vice versa.

This is natural when we find that that state of fragmentation in our countries isn't basically a reflection of the interests of the feudalist or bourgeois classes in our countries as much as it is a reflection of the interest of the international capitalist system in its colonialist and imperialist phase.

There is nothing more indicative of this inverse, as some people believe, relation between the classes and political entities than the law governing the size of the entity and the volume of the natural wealth available to it. We find ourselves face to face with a simultaneously strange and unique phenomenon, namely that the greater the natural wealth in a part of the homeland, the smaller is the size of the human and geographic entity and that the greater the size of the entity, the more deprived, we find, of abundant natural wealth it is.

It is not difficult to discover that there is behind the phenomenon another law of fragmentation established for the Arab nation by the hostile forces. This law is based not only on weakening the nation through fragmenting it, but also on weakening the entities by depriving them of any elements or forces that may permit these entities to play a unification role in the Arab area.

Regional Entities and Development

On the basis of this distorted distribution of wealth and of the artificial patterns of economic and social development, these entities are lured into economic and social development operations within the narrow regional frameworks, thus channelling this regional development to flow utimately into one of two directions:

First, to have the economic development turn into a development of the regional and provincial interests and of the forces that become hostile to any tendency to realize Arab economic integration in accordance with the well-known economic principles of the distribution of labor, specialization and comparative benefit. The political borders are thus strengthened with new economic barriers and the local bourgeoisies turn into conflicting regional bourgeoisies instead of having, by virtue of their tendency for expansion, aspirations for the broad pan-Arab market.

Second, to have the economic development in these entities turn into a process for developing the economic, social and cultural ties with the countries of the international capitalist market in a manner that makes it difficult to disengage this bond and to carry out the tasks of national liberation. Rather, this development process turns, because of its failure to take into consideration the necessary economic conditions, into a plain act of waste insofar as the small entity is concerned and an act of wide-scale plundering insofar as the imperialist capitalist center is concerned.

Regional State and Common Arab Cooperation

The regional state is a complete political reflection and embodiment of the fragmentation. These states deal with each other on the basis of common acceptance of the fragmentation. This is embodied most prominently in the Arab League where the representatives of the Arab states meet to try to solve the common problems between their states in a manner that harmonizes the regional interests within the framework of abidance by and observation of the independence of the member states and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs, i.e. within the framework of abidance by and observation of the Arab nation's fragmentation. By virtue of its international commitments, the regional state loses its right to represent the Arab nation. What is more, this state represents only that part on which it

exists. Within the framework of its domestic commitments, the regional state's task is confined to developing and protecting its regional interests, thus becoming incapable of safeguarding the pan-Arab interests. The regional states, without exception, are unsuccessful institutions. However, they are not all equal in their failure because they are different in area, population, wealth, systems of government, rulers and leaders. The question that poses itself very urgently now is: Can the regional states become a pan-Arab institution or not? In answering this question, some believe that a distinction must be made between what we call the Arab policy and the pan-Arab [al-qawmiyah] policy.

The Arab nation is an objective presence that imposes itself on the regionalists in the Arab homeland and each state finds itself compelled to take part in the Arab fateful battles because failure in each state's attempts to break away with its own destiny forces this state to enter the battles revolving around the common pan-Arab destiny. This is why we find that every regional state in the Arab homeland has an "Arab policy," i.e. a number of goals, plans and forces with which it participates in the ongoing struggle concerning the pan-Arab issues. The "Arab policy" of these states is different from their foreign policy in terms of goals, plans and forces. The foreign policy of the regional states in the Arab homeland is reflected in the activities and the relations that these states establish with other countries. This task is usually entrusted to the ministry of foreign affairs.

As for the "Arab policy," it is embodied in each Arab state's participation in the issues and tasks adopted by the Arab nation as a whole. Each state participates with its information, political or military agencies and establishments, depending on the nature and quality of the struggle and the extent of its direct connection with each of those regional states separately. The Arab states engage in this participation unwillingly because they cannot lag behind in contributing to the pan-Arab issues and cannot take a negative stance towards these issues as a result of the objective unity characterizing the pan-Arab problems. This involuntary participation is indicated by the spontaneous contributions that lack prior preparation and that lack initiative. This is because these states find themselves participating in a conflict touched off by other forces and this is why these states always take a defensive position. Even though all the Arab states paint their "Arab policy" with pan-Arab slogans and use such slogans to claim that they are pan-Arab states, the regional nature of this policy quickly exposes the falsehood of such claims. The basic line of the "Arab policy" of each state is confined to dealing with the pan-Arab issues in a manner that permits the regional state to retreat to positions compatible with its nature. Thus, we cannot consider every Arab action a pan-Arab participation, as we cannot acknowledge that every Arab policy is a pan-Arab policy just because it contributes to the Arab struggle issues informationally, politically or militarily.

In the light of all of this, the question remains: What is to be done?

If this is the picture of the Arab reality: Regional states whose Arab policies are subject to the element of "compulsion," whose goals are defensive goals with which they try to protect their regional presence from the dangers of the pan-Arab struggle and whose plans are based on sparing themselves the largest share possible of the struggle's burdens and responsiblities, even if these burdens and responsibilities are divided among the other Arab states; if these states are subjected to

large-scale plundering on the part of the imperialist capitalist center--an act embodied in the international monopolies' plundering of the natural wealth of these states and in the plundering of their resources by turning them into mere markets for the West's capital and consumer commodities and, moreover, by turning them into a new importer of the West's capital and production commodities that are often outdated by advanced industrial developments.

If this is the picture of the Arab reality, then the contribution of these regional states to the pan-Arab issues and the participation of their leaders and representatives in the summit conferences and in lower level conferences should not deceive us. We should also not expect from these states more than what is compatible with their regional nature and must always take into our account the possibility of their failing to meet their commitments and of their backing down on what is agreed upon in such conferences and meetings.

If there is any possible action under the canopy of the existing regional entities, then this action must focus in a concentrated manner on any effort capable of undermining the legitimacy of these entities and of pushing them toward gradual disappearance and merger in the desired pan-Arab state. Such efforts and activity are embodied in the following spheres:

First, intensifying the development plans based on the principle of Arab economic integration and exerting every possible effort with the various means and through the various establishments and organizations to invest the Arab monies in the economic and social projects that contribute to comprehensive Arab development and that work to demolish the barriers existing between the regional states.

Second, focusing on the creation of a single cultural, intellectual and educational base in the Arab homeland through the existing institutions and the institutions that can be introduced.

Third, expanding the land, sea and air communication network to cover the entire Arab area in order to facilitate movement and transportation in the Arab homeland, as well as strengthening and expanding the telecommunication network to cover every part of the homeland.

Fourth, facilitating the freedom of movement among these states for the Arab citizens and stressing the priority of employment of Arab labor in all these regions.

Fifth, encouraging inter-marriage among the Arab citizens and creating the psychological conditions and the material resources for the success of such intermarriages.

Sixth, struggling to gain advanced positions for democratic actions in these states in order to create the proper atmosphere for intellectual and political activities in these societies.

This is in addition to the minimum-limit measures that can be agreed upon to preserve the entities of these regional states and to protect them from agression and from being swallowed by hostile external forces and in addition to what can be agreed upon in terms of shouldering the responsibility for the continued struggle against the Zionist enemy.

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THOUGHTFULLY FORMULATED COMMON STRATEGY SEEN NECESSARY FOR BETTER TIES

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[Article by Dr Isma'il Sabri Muqallid, Professor of Political Sciences at University of Kuwait: "Arabs Need Leadership; Where Is Arab Collective Mind and Where Is Dialogue With Logic"]

[Text] The recent Amman summit once again raises the traditional question that has been asked frequently: "Where to and how?" We may add to this and ask: Is this optimism with which the official information media and instruments of the states taking part in the conference have emerged and which they have been trying to spread and propagate--is this optimism justifiable or is it some sort of a temporary sedative with which these media have been trying, as they did on all previous occasions, to make easier on us the bitter reality we are living with? Has this summit actually been able to overcome in the one day and one night which it lasted the harsh tribulation being experienced by this homeland and to emerge with a well-studied, even if only in some respects, common Arab action strategy that can fight all the factors of collapse and upheaval and that can withstand the violent storms and sudden fluctuations of the Arab policy which have become proverbial because of their frequency?

The answers to these questions and to many others may or may not at all be extremely snesitive and complex. Between this extreme and that one lies the real hardship encountered by whoever tries to analyze the conditions of the Arab policy, to explore its spheres and to predict its courses. I can almost claim that the separation of these conditions from all the acknowledged rules of political analysis has become a constant source of frustration to whoever tries to engage in such analysis. Perhaps this [fact] will (somewhat intercede on our behalf) in what we are about to discuss and present in such a narrow space.

There is no doubt that the Amman summit convened when all the realistic indicators confirmed decisively the presence of such an enormous fault in the Arab conditions for which we find no equal in any of the previous summits, despite the conflicts that accompanied the convocation of some and the pessimism that prevailed in the atmosphere of others. We have all felt fearful for this summit which was convened under such miserable circumstances. Moreover, there was the advance wager on its faltering and failure which came to add another setback to the record of the repeated setbacks experienced by the common Arab action throughout the past 20 years. Furthermore, we do not think that we would be exaggerating if we said

that there are many who viewed the Amman summit as no more than one of those routine meetings which it had been agreed to hold periodically, regardless of what results they may produce or what complications they may generate. If we add to this the boycott of some Arab governments and their warning aginst the convocation of this summit as such a wrong time when the disagreement complex has taken hold and has led to the constant division and deterioration of the general Arab situation after the failure of all the controls to perform their role, then the real picture would become clear to us without any groundless fabrication, exaggeration or allegation.

To be true, if we analyze the Arab reality under the conditions in which the Amman summit was held, we will notice the following very clearly:

1. The policies of polarization around a number of the conflicting centers of power and under various pan-Arab and ideological pretexts which are in the final analysis mere claims and superficial frameworks that are devoid of any real content compatible with the allegations of those citing them--these policies became feverishly active after having subsided for a period of time and after having brought this homeland nothing but harm throughout the period in which this polarization had been most active.

This is why we have [not] seen the Arab resources and capabilities employed for mapping out a pan-Arab strategy based on exploiting all the available means of strength and of moving them in the right direction in the light of the international reality and changes and in a manner that responds to the nature of the dangers and challenges engulfing us from every side and reaching, or almost reaching, their peak. Rather, we have found these resources moving in a completely faulty direction and being pushed toward a series of acts of internal attrition or, if you wish you can call them acts of self-destruction which have brought us to the point of the inability to engage in effective action with which to protect our nation and safeguard our supreme pan-Arab interests. This is a fact of which our enemies have been aware and on whose basis they have determined their calculations and their strategy that are against our interests and our stability.

The tragedy of the Arab differences reached its peak with the recent measures that some Arab countries have taken against others when they severed their diplomatic relations for reasons that go much deeper than the immediate reasons used by the parties involved as a pretext for severing relations. The situation has become so bad that we no longer see a complete normal model of the relationship that should bind any two Arab states. Matters reached the brink of a serious pitfall when two Arab states that had formed at one time the mainstay and the sensitive backbone of the eastern front amassed their forces and pushed their striking strategic weight to their common borders in an atmosphere abounding with threats and with mediations trying to avert the catastrophe before it could fall. It is as if we have gotten over the Lebanese war and the swamp of the Iraq-Iran war only to fall into the swamp of a new Syrian-Jordanian war that would have been tantamount to another sign of the fall of this nation in the historical test of whether to be or not to be.

2. Our burning psychological pain has been created and fanned by the official Arab information media. These media have again resumed their impulsive and

irresponsible practices of fabricating accusations that are based on no acceptable evidence and that are founded on casting doubt on everything. They have lowered themselves to unbecoming and unbefitting levels that are incompatible with the simplest ideals and ethics of international dealings, not to mention dealings among people who advocate the same cause and who are fateful partners!

With this hysterical uproar issuing day and night from the Arab information media which have gone completely beyond the limits of their pan-Arab duties and responsibilities and which have been dragged to the method of vituperation, the features of the truth have been defaced, all the objective values and criteria have been upturned and confidence has been lost amidst this deluge of mutual accusations.

Frankly, we must acknowledge without evasion or equivocation that no oppressive force has ever (buried) the vitality of this nation, dispersed its energy, disseminated in it the spirit of frustration, helped to entrench its doubts in every affair concerning it and killed its self-confidence as this kind of outrageous propaganda that goes to such extremes as to be completely blind to the truth at times and to be so tendentious and to vacillate from one extreme to the opposite with crude and unconvincing justifications at other times. This propaganda is motivated only by transient opportunism, even if the supreme national interest is the price and even if the result is poisoning the feelings of the Arab peoples and charging them with those fatal injections of mutual hatred. This outrageous propaganda has caused this nation to become aimless and to lose its vision, thus knowing less about its present than what it knows about its past. And let anybody contest this, if he so wishes.

3. The negligence that reaches practically the extent of full disavowal of the responsibility of carrying out the contractual commitments in which these Arab states have been involved either bilaterally or collectively.

The economic agreements concluded under the slogans of integration, of the desire to exchange material benefits and to translate the common interest into an effective reality in the life of the Arab peoples and societies and out of the belief that the political and national unity will not find an actual guarantee against the danger of setbacks except in this firm bond of interest;

The security agreements, the joint defense charters and the collective Arab security treaties concluded under slogans characterized by the desire to bolster the collective Arab military confrontation capability through the adoption of an effective and complete military strategy that can prove itself when the Arab national security--which is an indivisible whole and a priority goal that cannot be relinquished--demands;

The policitcal agreements concluded under the slogans of the desire to coordinate the positions and starting points by adopting the system of joint planning in facing the international changes and potentials and concluded due to the need to provide an effective collective ability in the sphere of international bargaining with both enemies and friends instead of having the negotiation conducted from a position of division and of conflicting inclinations and assessments;

All these agreements and, regrettably, in many cases have not had a value exceeding that of the ink with which they were written. The will to overcome hardships and challenges, regardless of the price, has not been found, and goodwill in interpreting some transient violations here and there has not been present and the element of the supreme national interest has not taken its right place in the calculations of the agencies in charge of making the policies and the decisions. Rather, it has seemed as if every side has been preparing to pounce on these agreements with the first opportunity providing with the justification to rebel against them. So what can we call this, even by any ordinary criterion of the common collective action that has proven its worth in many other parts of the world that are not united by one half what unites us?

4. The effectiveness of the agencies and institutions of the Arab League, in its capacity as an official channel organizing the course of the common Arab action, has deteriorated in a manner that is no longer a secret. The tribulation has intensified in the ill-omened post-Camp David era to the extent that I am afraid to say that this role no longer has an audible pulse. Even though we have been reading about the tendency to amend the Arab League charter, and we don't know for certain what spheres will the proposed amendment affect, the issue has never been one of turning out beautifully written charters or of innovating provisions and stipulations. The important thing is in actions, in intentions, in discipline, in having the spirit of responsibility, in loyalty to the supreme national interests, in the determination to accomplish, in opening up to the facts, in approaching the reality seriously and decisively, in making sacrifices when needed, in controls that do not waver in deterring the devious and in correcting those who swerve from consensus and in planning that rises to the level of the age and that constitutes the gate through which our Arab people cross to the future. Where does the Arab League stand vis-a-vis all this?

Formalities, superficialities, statements on occasions, evading confrontation with the reality, personal diplomacy predominated by the quality of courtesy--a diplomacy that fails to deal with the problems and their causes but adopts the method of sedation and drugging whose effects vanish rapidly only to have the pains reappear--[are the essence of the Arab League]. Where is the collective Arab mind? Where is the dialogue with logic? Where is objectivity and where is the truth? Moreover, and this is the most important: Where is the supreme national interest for whose realization this League was established amidst this maelstrom in which we have been caught for 35 years and which has dragged us to where we don't know where we are and where no mind can stop this maelstrom or put an end to its fearful swirl?

The entire world around us has changed and we have continued to stand in the same place without changing at all. The tribulations have not fused us, the catastrophes have not brought us back to our senses and have not taught us and the challenge of the age and the plots hatched against us from every direction have not made us narrow this fearful situation into which we have fallen.

What is worse and bitterer than all this is that we have not stopped seeking refuge under this broad canopy of loose slogans which, we know better than others, we cannot realize. But these slogans, like sedatives, have become a political must in our life throughout this homeland from the ocean to the Gulf.

5. Matters are further complicated by the complete shrinkage of the Egyptian role in the common Arab action issue. This is a national tragedy by all criteria and regardless of how hard some people try to minimize its impact and consequences, especially since the Camp David accords have faltered and reached a deadend because Israel has never abandoned its arrogant position and because it has insisted on getting everything in return for nothing. Israel wants security according to its theories, criteria and requirements and in a manner compatible with its schemes and responding to its long-range colonialist motives. It wants this peace without displaying any readiness to acknowledge the right of others to security, even in its simplest form and with its least conditions and requirements. Israel wants to get the lion's share of the interests and wants to impose the normalization according to its goals and strategy and without the least controls or reservations.

All this is happening at a time when Israel is implementing the most malicious settlement policies through which it seeks to change the identity and the landmarks and to impose the fait accompli in a manner that is most inciting to the pan-Arab conscience.

The self-rule negotiations have failed or are as good as having failed realistically despite the statements made to the contrary by the parties involved.

The question is: How long will the departure of Egypt, which is tantamount to the heart of this nation, last? Is there an imminent end to this catastrophe which is one of the worst catastrophes faced by the Arabs in their modern history?

After all this, let us ask: In view of all of this and despite the harshness of the Arab reality, some of whose circumstances and characteristics we have already pointed out, is it possible to proceed on the path of drawing up a general strategy for the common Arab action that will be safe from tremors and remote from any upheavals that could undermine and upturn it? Is it actually possible to reach such a result or anything close to it when the experience of past years stands completely clear before our eyes? In other words, what are the limits of the possible from which we can proceed with a reasonable degree of confidence in our intrinsic ability to achieve what is needed?

To answer, we must acknowledge from the beginning that any strategy or any effective formula for collective common action must have the following prerequisites:

One level of awareness of the existing dimensions and of the foreseeable possibilities of the reality, even though this does not preclude the presence of numerous opinions and varied interpretations. But ultimately, the parties involved in this strategy must be able to emerge with a common visualization and to adopt it as a starting point toward the common action.

General agreement on the nature of the challenges that this common strategy seeks to confront and not having these challenges mean something different to the mind of each of the parties involved.

General agreement on the common goals which this strategy seeks to realize within the framework of phased planning for both the immediate and the long-range goals according to the criterion of priorities and in a manner that guarantees the integration of the goals ultimately.

Agreement on the general spheres on which this common strategic planning will focus because this is what determines the level of the strategy's aspirations and the extent of its realism in light of what is actually available and possible.

Agreement on the dimensions of the resources and the facilities that have to be allocated for the purposes and responsibilities of implementation, as well as agreement on the most appropriate means on which this strategy can rely to reach its goals according to their internal arrangement--an agreement that comes as the result of close examination.

We may go on to add that the more possible it is to realize a high level of self-sufficiency in securing the resources and facilities necessary for implementation, the better it is not to rely to one degree or another on resources or circumstances that may be impossible to guarantee or to control under all conditions.

Agreement on the kind of agencies, institutions, notification and communication systems which constitute the backbone of such a common strategy, in addition to agreement on the followup and assessment agencies and on their connection with the policy and decision making agencies according to a pattern accepted and agreed upon by the states taking part in shouldering the responsibilities and duties of implementation.

Agreement on the integrated distribution of roles in light of the conditions and of the resources of each of the parties involved in transforming this strategy from the phase of theoretical planning to the phase of implementation.

Without specification or without this advance distribution of roles, responsibility is lost, accountability becomes impossible and the potentials for overlapping with all the confusion and the chaos accompanying it, escalate.

Finally, any effective strategy for collective common action must be flexible in its structure, its means and its goals so that it may be possible to modify it in order that it may keep up pace with transient developments, be they fundamental or limited and regardless of whether their causes and sources are due to the internal environment or are connected with external international changes.

Therefore, if we take the aforementioned fundamental considerations as a criterion for analogy and for assessing the common Arab action in the preceding period, we will notice:

First, the Arabs have not succeeded in crystallizing a complete and multi-dimensional action strategy capable of facing the existing regional (basically Zionist) and international (imperialism and the ambitions and plots of the major powers) with a complete perspective that comprehends the various factors and changing elements forming the situations with which the Arabs deal and that diagnoses carefully the intrinsic and international reality, designing ultimately a proper structure for a common Arab strategy that rises to the level of the historical phase within whose framework this strategy emanates [sic].

Second, the Arab responses to the pressures and challenges of the reality have been characterized by impulsiveness and by the narrow view that confines itself to the immediate circumstances. Therefore, these responses have not tried to anticipate the events, to plan for eventualities and to establish some sort of controls through which to get even a partial hold of the situations and the events. As a result, the spheres of action have narrowed in the face of these responses and they have lost the ability to take the initiative.

Because of the above, Arab coordination has not materialized in any effective and comprehensive form. When such coordination did happen to appear in a certain sector of the Arab dealings, then it disappeared with the same speed with which it appeared, meaning that the structures on which such limited coordination was based were brittle and liable to collapse and fall under the impact of any shock. In other words, no capabilities were employed to absorb and overcome those shocks in order to secure this common Arab action against the danger of quick setbacks.

Third, added to this is the fact that there was no advance and definite official distribution of roles. The inevitable result in the absence of such specification was that some parties were burdened with more than they could shoulder whereas other parties were almost completely exempted from shouldering any responsibilities.

Due to the loss of balance in shouldering the duties and responsibilities, there emerged enormous (differences) which ended up freezing, and even foiling and sabotaging, this common action.

We don't imagine that many were not aware of this flagrant (difference). But what is truly painful is that this (difference) was not faced decisively and was accepted as one of the acknowledged facts of the Arab reality which nobody could change, even though it reflected a totally abnormal situation by any acknowledged criterion of collective common action.

It may be our duty here to state frankly that the gap in wealth and the difference in the economic conditions in the Arab homeland have also contributed in their turn to implanting and entrenching certain sensitivities concerning the concept of common benefit and regarding the use of the sacrifice made on the part of the rich and capable sides in the interest of the poor sides, especially since the latter sides--particularly as regimes--were under the influence of the revolutionary and socialist ideas projected and propagated by Nasirism, for example, throughout a large part of the 1950's and 1960's.

The common action has suffered from this classism, if we may use the expression, at the general Arab level and the problem has been a lot more complex than to find an easy and acceptable solution on which all the sides agree.

The issue that has been, or should have been, raised is: How can we narrow the gap, with all its senstivities and complex psychological residues, between the brothers and the partners in destiny, especially since the problem of the poor and rich worlds has turned into a many-sided problem that is not confined to one certain international group or one specific geographical area?

In other words, how could we proceed on the basis of a common visualization, one level of awareness and of similar feelings and emotions when the conditions of the internal reality have varied clearly, have created differing preoccupations, interests and aspirations and have generated different sentiments vis-a-vis the outside world? Moreover, how could the needs be integrated when some of us feel that they can do without the others because they possess that which fate has denied the others?

The need for common action must emanate by necessity from common needs. But for some of us to feel this need while others feel that it is absolutely insignificant, then this is undoubtedly another flagrant and unpermissible difference.

There are lots and lots of fundamentals and of subsidiary details which we can cite in the context of enumerating the negative aspects and obvious flaws of the Arab common action--negative aspects and flaws that harmed this action in the past to such an extent that cannot be discussed in this space or in such a manner that extraordinary courage is required to reveal the facts in some sort of self-criticism in which I personally find no harm, if it is done positively and constructively. Perhaps such self-criticism will put our feet at the beginning of the right path.

But the question that we raised at the outset, namely the question of "where to and how," remains pending and undecided. As we have already pointed out, the answer to this question may range from complicating matters to the point where they become impossible to simplifying them to the point where they become ridiculous. They are complicated if we try to dive into the depths of the existing reality with an examining and scrutinizing look and they may not be complicated at all if we content outselves with simple formulations that require no effort and waste no time.

Therefore, if I may finally suggest something, then I can say the following:

1. Agreement must be reached on definite motives for this common Arab action so that we may overcome the issues of ideological difference which will continue to be a natural and constant characteristic of government under the canopy of the present division and multiplicity.

The planning for the common Arab action has to emanate from a clear determination of the Arab national needs, from agreement on the priorities of these needs and from their linkage with one another, both strategically and in terms of timing. Without such determination, we will continue to revolve in the same vicious circle.

2. A clear method must be defined for dealing with the major international powers and with the outside world generally--a definition emanating from the decisive determination of the supreme Arab national needs and not from the narrow regional view or from the viewpoint of the interest and security requirement of a regime. A definite national criterion will become thus available to assess the actions of these major powers and to crystallize common and coordinated Arab reactions to these actions--reactions based on these actions' meeting with or departure from the supreme national needs. As for these seemingly everlasting ties with this or that power, regardless of negative ramifications of such power's actions to the supreme Arab national interests, there isn't the least doubt that these ties form the strongest elements of sabotage against any Arab common action strategy.

3. The subsidiary and transient Arab differences could constitute an acceptable and harmless phenomenon because we cannot confiscate or abolish opinions. Moreover, it is totally unrealistic to impose a compulsory behavioral pattern on all, regardless of how far such a pattern agrees or disagrees with the principled convictions of this or that side.

But, and this is what is important, there has to be a precautionary or preventive Arab diplomacy capable of preventing escalation of subsidiary differences and of preventing these differences from taking faulty directions rejected by all criteria of the supreme national interest.

What I mean by this is that we must reach a developed diplomatic pattern divorced from the outdated tradtional framework that is currently in force and that is characterized by its slow movement, its backward means and its narrow scope. What I mean is a diplomacy relying on early alarm and warning outfits so that it moves may come at a time when it is easy to contain and cordon off conflicts before their danger spreads, their ramifications extend and their effects deepen.

4. The concept of Arab national security must be freed of the literal and immediate formulas of security so that it may not turn into a military security. The elements and mainstays of this security must be varied so that it may be ultimately capable of performing the task set for it, namely that of protecting the Arab nation. Therefore, this security has to be a psychological, political and economic security before being a mere military security.

5. Agreement has to be reached on the need to introduce fundamental changes in the Arab information methods so that these irresponsible practices may come to an end and so that the media may resume their constructive role in serving the goals of the common Arab action instead of being the most destructive weapons obstructing the tasks of this action.

6. The official common Arab action has to be accompanied by common action at the popular level. This requires fundamentally elimination of all the barriers standing in the face of popular dealings and communication. It also requires bolstering the unofficial cooperation in all the economic, social, scientific, cultural and tourism spheres.

Finally, and with utter frankness, the Arabs are now in the direst need of a new historic leadership that gives them the feeling of the unity of direction, of goal and of destiny and that makes them look to the broad spheres of the future with a spirit abounding with confidence and hope. Could this be the moment of labor, a labor which we hope will not last long?

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ARAB BUDGET TO MEET COMMON ARAB NEEDS SEEN NECESSARY

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 15 Dec 80 pp 1, 21

[Article by Dr Hazim al-Biblawi: "Least Advice Be Lot of Some and Struggle Lot of Others"]

[Text] Within the framework of the dialogue on a rational logic for the Arab relations, Dr Hazim al-Biblawi, the well-known economics professor, has sent a message to Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih discussing what the latter had written under the title of "Beginning in Egypt, But When Will Egypt Return?" The message brings up the issue from a different angle, namely: Egypt's duty and the duty of the others. Let the reader permit us to turn the message into a main article in the dialogue because it is actually so.

I begin by agreement with the introductory opinions expressed in the article, especially when it stresses that "no economic development can be created in one Arab country in isolation from the other countries because the Arab entities are integrated economically and socially" and that "the first action required is unification or, I must say, a return to our nature as one nation and as a single geographic and historical unit with a single economy and a single policy."

My questions begin when the writer moves from diagnosis to treatment and expresses the view that "only Egypt is capable of performing the vanguard role in the unification" and says that "the Arabs are fortunate the Egyptian people's vanguards are leading the struggle inside Egypt and are capable, with the sympathy and assistance of the Arab people, of bringing about the change so that Egypt may resume its natural and vanguard role."

Even though I do not conceal the joy that flooded me when I found that there are still among the Arab papers those that will give Egypt its due, pointing out its civilization, its people, its population and its geographic location, let me say frankly that I do not agree with the writer or with the general position of many Arab intellectuals who believe that the reform and the solutions lie there on the other bank of the river and that there is nothing to be done here other than show sympathy and wait! This seems to me some sort of an easy choice and of self-absolution after declaring one's opinion and waiting for results, without doing anything.

I will not disagree on the importance and vitality of Egypt's role but I believe that in the current historic phase, the Arab Gulf states have another role equal to that of the Egypt of action. But struggle is necessary here as it is necessary there. Rather, perhaps the need for action to start from al-Dahiyah is clearer than the need for it in al-Darb al-Ahmar or in al-Anfushi.

In an old article I published in AL-WATAN on 15 October 1978 under the title of "With or Against Camp David"--and I believe that the article brought me more wrath than admiration--I tried to remind the reader of the importance and significance of the role of the Arab oil states, not only in assisting and financing or in offering advice and guidance but also in determing the future of this nation. I also reminded how these states' backing down on using their intrinsic capabilities could bear the worst consequences for the entire Arab nation. I don't remember exactly the words of that article but I tried in it to distinguish between the 1950's and 1960's on the one hand and the 1970's and 1980's on the other. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Arab nation was still unrealized potentials. Until the end of the 1950's, political independence was still the main issue for the major number of the Arab countries. This situation continued even to the end of the 1960's, as in the case of the Gulf emirates and Aden. The grip of the oil companies on the most important resource of the age was still absolute or almost absolute. I need not say that the differences in the levels of income in various parts of the Arab homeland were limited. Under those conditions, the Egyptian role was most significant. The issue raised was primarily an issue of political, social and economic awareness. The slogan of "Arab oil for the Arabs" emanating from Cairo was significant and meaningful in stirring the entire Arab awareness to demand the Arab right to control the Arab natural resources. There also was the Suez Canal and other things.

But the situation changed a lot in the 1970's. The Arab nation was no longer mere potential capabilities but turned into intrinsic resources and the matter was no longer connected with awareness to demand the right of control but became connected with handling the financial and oil resources possessed by the Arab states, or rather by some of them. In this regard, a decision by the OPEC or the OAPEC [Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries] is equal to a thousand speeches in 'Abidin or al-Manshiyah [palaces in Egypt].

I wish Mr Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih and the reader will fully understand me: I don't mean to minimize Egypt's role and weight and neither do I want to minimize the need for reform in Egypt, as in Syria and Iraq... But I want to underline a phenomenon which, I fear, has begun to spread among a number of Arab intellectuals, especially in the oil countries, who believe that their cultural and historical role is limited, that it is enough to declare principled positions and to offer the others advice on action and struggle and that it is enough for them to advocate and express support and sympathy. No and no again. Action and struggle are required everywhere in the Arab nation and, I fear to say, they are required by the same degree and perhaps to a greater degree in the Arab oil states.

In a meeting which included some colleagues last evening, I learned that the OAPEC is about to finance a new energy research center in Oxford and that 600,000 pounds sterling have been allocated for this purpose. Before, we heard about the

establishment of an Islamic history chair in Southern California [presumably meaning at USC] and millions of dollars and about strengthening the Georgetown [University] Middle East Studies Center and more millions. Have we heard of anything similar regarding Alexandria or Aleppo University? I know that some people may object to Alexandria because Cairo approved Camp David. But is Georgetown or Oxford less approving? What about Aleppo or Amman? Have we heard about the Islamic medical conferences and the funds allocated for them? Isn't it more beneficial for the awakening of the Islamic medicine to rebuild Qasr al-'Ayni Hospital which has graduated most of the Arab doctors?

I know that the Arab oil states have given and continue to give the Arab sisters big financial aid. This is a commendable effort whose weight or benefit cannot be minimized. I am also aware of the difficulties which the development institutions of these states encounter in their search for well-studied projects, the harassment they face in implementation and the mismanagement they experience. But doesn't the writer say that "the action required primarily is to return to our nature as an Arab nation and as a single geographical and historical unit with a single economy and a single policy?" Does he agree to have spending on education or on communications in al-Jahra's be reduced because its population is less capable than al-Ahmadi's to generate projects or are less capable in management? Are Jubayl's and Yanbu's projects determined on the basis of the energy and effort of their sons?

Of course I am not unaware of the difference between "Arab unity" and "national unity." I don't even want to eliminate these differences. But if Arab unity represents a goal, then isn't it natural for us to overlook some of these difficulties or to stop using them so much to justify our failure in this regard? Don't we see, despite this, that the Arab Gulf intellectual has an opportunity to work and struggle, even outside of Egypt?

In 1976, a conference of Arab economists was held in Kuwait to discuss "the new international economic system" and I presented to it a paper termed "toward a new Arab economic system." I pointed out in the paper, among other things, that the time may have come for looking into setting up an Arab budget to meet the Arab needs. As domestic development has known the emergence of the public budget side by side with the private budget, the Arab relations may be about to develop an Arab budget side by side with the regional budget of each Arab country. Domestic development gave rise to public needs that concern the group in its entirety, in addition to the private needs that concern each individual separately. Defense, security and justice are public needs, regardless of each individual. Financing the public needs has required resorting to public financial methods, such as taxes which are paid on the basis of the ability to pay and not the basis of benefit derived from the service. The Arab nation is experiencing this kind of development at present. Arab security, Arab food, the Arab intellect and Arab health are all needs that concern the Arab nation in its entirety. Financing these needs may require some kind of Arab financing on the basis of the ability to pay. The fact is that it must be acknowledged that in its moments of danger, the Arab nation knew this kind of budget when the Arab oil countries financed, and continue to finance, the weapon deals of the confrontation states. This constitutes an acknowledgement that Arab security is one of the Arab needs which require financing on the basis of the ability to pay. But military security is

a mere defense of the material presence and is one of the most primitive forms of self-defense. The cultural presence is more important and significant for a nation that claims to have a humanitarian message. Why don't we view education in all the Arab countries as an Arab need that has to be financed by the Arab states collectively on the basis of the participation of each according to its ability. Have you had the chance, for example, to see Cairo airport just before the start of the academic year? It is an enormous and exciting sight. As soon as the airport announces departure of the Algiers plane, hunderds of people, most of them teachers, rush to the gates. A few minutes later, departure of the Jiddah plane is announced and you see hundreds of others rushing to the gate. Then the Abu Dhabi, the Kuwait, the San'a', the Riyadh and the Mogadiscio planes... Isn't this the unified Arab education? Don't you agree with me that is is a disgrace for our Arab nation that illiteracy is increasing in Egypt at the same time and that the new classrooms are not enough to absorb the children of the farmers? I believe you will not disagree with me that compensating each of the departing teachers with threefold, sixfold or even tenfold the wages he earns in Egypt is not enough? Do you agree with me that we are actually working to protect the future of the Arab mind, especially since you and I know that even the so-called increase in the income of workers is most frequently spent on new colored televisions sets, videos, cars and refrigerators and rarely helps to open new classrooms for education in Egypt or in the other oil countries? Here, I ask Mr Muhammad Musa'id: Don't you agree with me that there are things that can be said and done outside Egypt?

I also ask him: Have you heard our discussions on the common Arab economy? You may have noticed that we never get tired of talking about guarantees for the Arab capital, about the harassment it faces, about the commercial and non-commerical risks and about the need to approve the Arab investment spending. Have you heard similar discussions on Arab labor and if you have heard them, then have you noticed the same insistence and stress on the rights and guarantees of the Arab labor? I don't think that we disagree that a glance at the Arab arena will suffice as testimony to what the Arab labor has done for the Arab nation--and what it has done exceeds many times over what the Arab capital has. Don't you agree with me that the matter requires a little struggle on the part of the states that receive this Arab labor in order to secure it and protect it economically and psychologically.

Finally, I don't want us to exchange roles with this discussion. Mr Muhammad Musa'id starts by taking the role of adviser and spectator, saying everything begins there, in Egypt, with our sympathy. I then take my turn to protest and to take the role of adviser and spectator, saying everything begins there, in the Gulf, with our sympathy.

I know that there are limits to what the Arab oil states can do, and some of these limitations are extremely harsh. I also agree that there is a lot that can be done in Egypt and that is beneficial to the Arab nation. But I have only meant to demonstrate through this discussion that we need the work and advice of all. What I object to is to have advice as the lot of some and struggle as the lot of others. Struggle is required everywhere.

God is behind all intent.

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INSTITUTIONALIZATION SEEN ESSENTIAL FOR BETTER RELATIONS

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 16 Dec 80 pp 1, 10

[Article by Dr Kamal Abu-al-Majd: "Endeavor to Hold First Thread"]

[Text] I know numerous Arab writers, famous for their honesty and seriousness, who have almost gone rusty and have stopped writing on major issues because fatal perplexity has possessed them thus causing them to retreat, pondering, grieving and trying to understand the "strange Arab phenomena" to which they open their eyes every morning.

They are not given the opportunity to know enough about what is taking place so that they may settle on a clear opinion from which to start the voyage of thought and of the expression of opinion.

And they are not given enough freedom to say what they want so that they may contribute with the word to guiding their society and performing their role in it.

I will not deny that this pen is one of those pens and that I have often tried to tame it to start writing anew. But every time it looks at the Arab atmosphere around it, it finds that the ongoing dialogue consists of battles and duels, that all people are angry, that the voices are loud and clamorous, that the motives of whoever holds a different opinion are subject to accusation, that the loyalty, honesty and impartiality of such a person is contested and that the calm word has no listeners. So my pen retreats again, waiting for the unknown.

The secret of this shock from which many have not recovered is that the Arab eyes saw the glorious days of 1973 which found the Egyptian, the Syrian, the Iraqi, the Algerian, the Kuwaiti, the Tunisian and the Moroccan stand in the same trench and in the face of the same enemy in a common stance and found them scoring an indubitable victory, gaining territory on which the enemy had been entrenched for years and besieging an army about which every myth in the world had been talking almost to the point of shaking the Arab self-confidence. The weapon of money met with the weapon of combat, the weapon of organization and planning and the weapon of calm and sedate information. The Arab lung was filled with the pure air of confidence and the scope of broad hope extended before the entire generation. The entire world talked about the Arabs, the study centers described them as the sixth power in the world and both friend and foe were surprised to find that Arab

nationalism was a reality, that Arab cooperation and coordination was an indubitable fact and that the Arab ability was also a fact which imposed itself on the world.

The alarm then went off in major capitals and certain decisions were made.

Hardly a few years passed when the Arab eyes that had seen the glories of 1973 were opened to a new reality:

1. Egypt, which was the central link in all that had been achieved, from which the voice of the Arabs from the ocean to the Gulf emanated for long years, in whose capital the Arab decisions were made, to which the seekers of knowledge, opinion, security and patriotism had resorted and the Egypt of civilization, military strength, the store of experience, the meeting place of kings, presidents, strugglers and refugees--this Egypt is now going in one direction and the other Arabs are going in another direction. This Egypt is "boycotted," "fought," accused and expelled from the Arab League and the offices of the Arab and "international" organizations are moved out of it in a sad series.

The Arab action is deprived of Egypt and Egypt is deprived of it and this estrangement has been prolonged to the extent where people are almost accustomed to it without any effort being made or any voice being raised to declare that no land can be liberated, no right regained and no danger be repelled under the canopy of this estrangement.

2. The conflicts between the other Arab countries escalate and multiply and before one of these conflicts subsides another flares up. Groups of these countries move closer to each other and then move apart with such speed and intensity that escape comprehension and that give the impression that the motives for rapprochement and for estrangement are personal, selfish and tied to the interests and prestige of the rulers and that the people's interests, not to mention the interests of the entire Arab nation, are far from the minds and not taken into any calculations. Thus, every Arab has become aware that the current Arab crisis goes beyond the problem of the "relationship with Egypt," that Arab fragmentation is the characteristic of the phase and that this fragmentation is what has stopped the joint Arab action and what has caused the Arab accomplishment in all spheres to retreat.

Yes, the bilateral and collective meetings have not stopped and resolutions are still issued in the wake of each meeting declaring that the positions are identical and that the meeting has been crowned with unprecedented success!

But an Arab who retreats to the seclusion of his own privacy after folding the paper and turning off the radio discovers that his causes are faltering, that movement is on a path that is mostly blocked, that his declared goals for years are only getting remoter, that liberation of the land has become a pale slogan for being chewed so often and for being belied by the real situation. Setting up a secular state on the soil of Palestine, as the PLO wants, is a magnificent utopia. But the distance between this utopia and the reality is like the distance between the farthest east and the farthest west. Else, let somebody, anybody, tell us how this state is to be set up, who is to set it up and how is the Zionist entity that is armed to the teeth, that has annexed East Jerusalem and made it its capital and

that is about to declare annexation of the Golan to be forced [to accept it]. Is this state to be set up by the parties that have chosen the path of peace and of normalized relations or by the parties that have rejected this path and that have not yet agreed on another path? Or will this state be perhaps set up by the PLO whose struggiers are being harassed by the Arab states that are most enthusiastic for liquidation of the Zionist entity (sic) and that are most vociferous in their acknowledgement of the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people?"

3. Egypt's absence from the Arab arena, the division and ever-renewed conflicts of the other Arab states and the war that suddenly flared up between Iraq and Iran have all formed a sphere of enormous attraction to the major powers and we find that the fleets and armies of the two superpowers are now guests of the area and have almost reached the innermost centers of this area after years of efforts to avoid such a presence for fear of its dangers and to safeguard the Arab's security and independence.

I Rather Disagree

Dear reader, a writer may choose to be silent and may choose to impose this silence on his pen and tongue. But if he holds the pen and chooses to write or if he is tempted to write or gets involved in writing, then he has no choice but to be true and frank.

The current Arab situation characterized by "utter chaos" and what is most serious in this situation is the loss of goals, yes the "loss of goals."

One of the gentlemen who preceded me in writing in this place has said that perhaps "not two sincere people in the Arab homeland disagree on the Arab struggle's goals and objectives which are embodied in setting the united state and the democratic society in which social justice is realized after liberation of the usurped Arab territories." I beg to disagree here and to say very loudly that the "goals are no longer clear" and that there is a big difference between the set goals of the movement of a nation that actually works on the basis of reality on the one hand and phrases and words that dream of the sublime ideal and that paint a magnificent poetic picture of what is wanted from the God of men on the other hand.

I ask with utter sincerity and frankness:

1. Is liberation of the usurped territories, including the Palestinian territories occupied in 1947 and 1948, still a goal agreed upon among the Arab states and a goal for which a course is planned, even if it takes a thousand years to cover?

2. Is setting up the united state still a goal of the existing Arab states and of their various regimes? Are these states really exerting efforts to realize this goal?

3. Is setting up the democratic society in which social justice is realized still a goal agreed upon? Does the conduct of the Arab regimes underline the concept of democracy, both politically and socially?

I do not want to go on analyzing what has happened and what is occurring. Now that I have gotten to the point of talking about goals, it suffices me to try, with brevity, to hold what I believe to be the first of numerous threads from which we can all weave a draft program for national salvation.

Regarding Goals

1. I urge the Arab heads of state and the leaders of the Arab movements to stop calling for "setting up the united state" about which some people talk--amidst the bitter reality--as they talk about the absent al-mahdi [the rightly guided one] who will return. The Arab nation's unity doesn't necessarily mean combining all the Arabs in a "single state." Dozens of objective circumstances make this dream unattainable in the near future. The insistence on "political unification" in its maximum form, namely the "united state," is what creates the psychological barriers and numerous other barriers in the face of the unionist action in all spheres. I again state that this maximum limit is rejected at present by the overwhelming majority of the Arab leaderships. Ask those who have supervised the Arab economic action through the Arab League and who have held successively the positions of responsibility in the Social and Economic Council and in the secretariat of the Economic Unity Council. Ask them privately and far from the eyes and ears of watchers about the secret behind the faltering of the common economic action projects and you will hear from them, in the moments of truth, what I have already heard without equivocation about the reason being "purely political because the Arab governments do not want unity and do not believe in it sufficiently." How I wish that those who still advocate the creation of the "immediate merger unity" would refer to the pioneer study conducted by the Arab Unity Studies Center in Beirut throughout 2 full years on "measuring the Arab public opinion's inclinations regarding unity" which the center published in 1980. If these advocates refer to the study, they would find out how this measurement led to discovering that "the Arab masses have developed a new kind of political realism and they have no objection to the gradual and constitutional realization of unity, beginning with a more serious political, military and economic coordination than exists at present."

The Arab heads of state and leaders have had the opportunity to observe the masses' movement, to discover that the romantic era of the "immediate merger unity" has gone and that the new acceptable basis of Arab unification is that of persuading the Arab states that their security is in danger, that their vital interests are in danger and that safeguarding this security and those interests is realized, at least by a larger degree, through cooperation and coordination with the other Arab states. Within the framework of this new objective fact, the unity projects must not exceed the limits of the reality suddenly to jump anew to forms of political or constitutional unity that are doomed to setbacks, to retreat and to abortion even before they are born.

2. As for "liberation of the occupied territories," this is a more complex matter because the issue has, very regrettably, turned among many into a negative position confined to "rejecting" the official Egyptian position which is based on ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and replacing it by an immediate peace and normalized relations with the Zionist entity, without any move to realize the same goal, namely that of "liberating the land," in any other way.

I don't want to involve myself here in the policies and positions of the Arab states. I am talking about the feeling of the Arab citizen when he reviews the outcome of the Arab action for liberation of the occupied territories 3 years after President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and finds nothing but an endless submersion in propaganda campaigns, internal battles and subsidiary conflicts followed by attempts on the part of people with goodwill to repair matters while the fait accompli imposed by the force of the Israeli weapons continues to gain strength and stability to the point where the issue of the "usurped Arab territories" is about to turn from a political demand to a historical call.

Sincerity and the truth should spare us all embarrassment when we state very frankly that the Arab states which have rejected the logic of the Jerusalem visit and of the Camp David accords--and they have the abolute right to such rejection--are required to move faster to find an alternative, else their objection to the accords loses its theoretical logic and will gradually lose its practical value.

Three Letters

As for the means, the talk about them can be long and diverse. However, I will content myself with dotting three ii's which I believe constitute the ends of some important threads in streamlining the Arab action:

1. The Arab citizen is suffering, sadly and desperately, from his relationship with his rulers. In most of the Arab countries, the decisions are made in his name whereas there is no participation on the citizen's part and the fateful positions are often taken within the framework of the quality and level of the relations prevailing among the rulers as individuals. If some rulers like others, unity is declared, joint action is embarked upon and the banners of solidarity are raised. But if one face [leader] frowns at another and if one gets angry at a word said in a ceremony, reported by a newspaper or whispered by a malicious informer, then the relations turn tense, projects come to a halt, unity plans are frozen, the broadcasting stations proceed to perform their set role, armies may be amassed on the borders and the entire structure of Arabism almost collapses on whatever and whoever is in it if a wise man doesn't hasten to appease the angry and to apologize in the name of the wrongdoers. This is unimaginable and unpermissible.

Political and legal scholars tell us about the importance of what they call institutionalization and use this institutionalization as the sound criterion for replacement of the tribe by the state. A state has institutions with an entity and with a collective identity separate from that of the persons of the rulers. Institutionalization means actually putting the collective interests represented by the government institutions above the visualizations, interests and emotions of the persons of the rulers. The Arab states will not be able to determine for themselves firm goals or follow in their relations with each other or their relations with the world courses with a reasonable degree of harmony and compatibility unless "institutionalization" takes place within each one of these states. The continued presence of the major Arab interests under the mercy of the personal relations among many of the Arab rulers constitutes the cornerstone in the tragedy of the Arab reality.

2. What we may call "modernization of the method of formulating policies and adopting decisions" is linked to, if it doesn't constitute a part of, institutionalization. In this complicated world where computers are used to observe and analyze phenomena and to compare and weigh the alternatives, it is unimaginable that the Arab world should remain in its (primitive) state and that Arab decisions should be taken on the basis of "haphazardly individual assessment" that does not rely on intelligence and sound evaluation. Such assessment actually emanates from fleeting ideas, transient visions and incidental conversations. This is tantamount to risking and gambling with the Arab people's interests and is a phenomenon that has to be dealt with quickly. The examples are present, the means are available and implementation is possible if faith is established in the need to "modernize the Arab political decision" because this modernization is a part of the indispensable rationalization amidst the fearful rivalry in which all the Arabs are engaged within the framework of a yet undecided conflict with an enemy who still occupies Arab lands and whose ambitions exceed all that dreamers can imagine.

3. What friend Mr Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih has called "Egypt's return to the Arab entity" is something for whose realization efforts must be exerted. I am afraid that the barrier obstructing such a return is the atmosphere of intellectual intimidation created and perpetuated by the enemies of the Arab nation who are aware of this estrangement. I understand, with utter objectivity, the dimensions of the difficulties facing this endeavor. I am also aware of the gap existing at present between Egypt and the other Arab states. But in issuing this call, I proceed on the basis of my awareness--and how I wish it were wrong--of the size of the dangers facing the entire Arab nation and the dimensions of the surgeries that some forces wish to perform on the heart and extremes of this nation. The interests of the Arab nation are bigger and more immortal than all the nation's rulers and regimes. It isn't true that every crack in the Arab nation's unity can be repaired and that all the nation's wounds will heal some day. This is because the estrangement has gone on for too long, because new conditions have been built on it and because new inclinations have developed under its canopy. I fear that obviating all this will be difficult and that the price will be exorbitant. Egypt is not Camp David and the Arab causes are more comprehensive and bigger than the entire Zionist entity.

Every sincere Arab is completely astonished how the Arab officials on both sides of the conflict have enough tolerance for their foes and enemies but no similar tolerance in their relations with each other! Such a citizen is also completely astonished how the Arab arena is devoid of any well-meaning mediator who seeks to mend matters, to establish bridges and to remind of the need to confine the disagreement within its natural limits now that it has gone far beyond these limits! Don't the intellectuals, writers and others who are affiliated with the current of Arabism think that moving to undertake this role, before it is too late, is one of the fundamental tasks of this phase? Don't they think that it is difficult for the governments, now that the estrangement between them has reached this limit, to take the initiative on the path of obviation and mending? This matter requires calm discussion sessions among the intellectuals after which these intellectuals should perform a clear-cut and well-studied role with clear objectives--a role that may open the path for Egypt's full return to the Arab entity?

4. I conclude this discussion with a renewed call for opening a dialogue on all these issues among both the intellectuals and the Arab official circles.

When I talk of "dialogue," I mean something other than the intellectual intimidation acts which many commit when they present a single opinion violently, rashly and impulsively, hinting in their presentation that the arena is too narrow for the other opinion and that the other opinion must be treasonous and aligned with the Arab nation's enemies. Thus the dialogue ends where it should start and the doors of good deeds are closed when the need arises for opening and folding papers that had to be published.

AL-WATAN has had the credit for breaking the barrier of hesitation in the expression of opinion among many. Perhaps the objective and free dialogue in which many have taken part so far will be the beginning for objective discussions which will extend from Kuwait to include the entire Arab homeland.

8494
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CALL FOR ARAB POPULAR CONFERENCE SUPPORTED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Dec 80 pp 1, 8

[Article by Faysal Hassun, Former Doyen of Iraqi Journalists: "Let Popular Conference Declare This Nation's Word"]

[Text] The call raised by AL-WATAN for an Arab dialogue seeking "a rational logic for the Arab relations" reminds of the call raised in 1956 for the establishment of an Arab popular league to deal with the negative aspects accompanying the procession of the official Arab League.

I recall that that call was adopted by the Iraqi Independence Party at the time and that the campaign to propagate the call was led by the late Fa'iq al-Samarra'i when he went to Egypt to contact its opinion makers to persuade them to adopt the idea of the creation of an Arab popular league that wouldn't be an alternative to the official League but would carry out what the official League could not do for the unity of the Arab action and in order to realize the Arab nation's solidarity and to rally the nation behind its causes and its interest so as to avert the dangers of fragmentation and estrangement which were threatening the national presence and which were embodied in the rise of the axes which at the time divided the Arab states into conflicting, not to say warring, camps.

Thirty four years ago, before the fall of the tragedy of the loss of Palestine and in the wake of the end of World War II and the emergence of new Arab entities which wrested their independence and joined the Arab League, founded officially on 21 March 1945, Arab disagreement surfaced for the first time, perhaps at the time or after convocation of the first Arab summit in Inshas where former King Faruq had a farm.

Even though the Inshas summit sought to unite the word of the Arabs in confronting the new challenges which Zionism, supported by the US-British influence and domination, threw in the Arab court. However, the Radwa meeting, held before the Inshas summit in Saudi Arabia between the late Kings 'Abd-al'Aziz Al Sa'ud and Faruq, may God have mercy upon their souls, had driven the first nail into the Arab nation's entity when the Saudi-Egyptian axis was born to counter what was supposed to be a Hashimite axis embracing Baghdad and Amman. The two axes inherited an old traditional hostility dating back to that conflict which was settled in the early 1920's with the Al Sa'ud's wresting of the Hejaz crown from

[Hashimite] King Husayn ibn 'Ali and his heirs and which continued between the Hashimites and the Saudis in the form of estrangement and reserve until the early 1960's.

Egypt joined the Saudi axis while Baghdad acted in solidarity with Amman in entrenching the Hashimite axis which had not been cohesive before the Radwa meeting. The Hashimite axis was led by Prince 'Abdallah ibn al-Husayn, before he became king, who was supported by his nephew Prince 'Abd-al-Ilah, Iraq's Prince Regent from 1939 to 1953.

Even though the Arab nation had been facing the test of the Zionist challenge since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and even though it should have put aside its differences, at least on the eve of the first defeat with which the Palestinian entity was lost, I will not forget for as long as I live that discussion which I had with the late Riyad al-Sulh at the White Palace--the guesthouse at the time--in Baghdad at the end of April 1948 when al-Sulh, then Lebanon's prime minister arrived at the palace in the company of Jamil Mardam, Syria's prime minister, on their way back from Riyadh where they had met with King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud.

I said: Can you tell us something about your trip and the current Arab situation?

He answered in an oratory tone: The time for words has ended and the time for action has come.

When I ridiculed his statement, asserting that it had become more like a cracked record which we had gotten tired of hearing, the man shook with anger, saying:

What do you want me to say when we are approaching a fateful battle? Do you know that until yesterday, the Saudi-Hashimite conflict was still a barrier in the face of creating a unified Arab command to take charge of directing the Arab armies in Palestine? Do you want me to declare that the Saudis refuse the Jordanian army's entry to Palestine because they fear expansion of Prince 'Abdallah's domain at their expense or at the expense of the historical enmity between them and the Hashimites?

I was stunned to hear such words at a time when I was still clinging to the highest national ideals and was as far as can be from political Machiavellianism. So I said: But could the two axes let Palestine be usurped by the Jews without settling their differences, even if only for the sake of waging the battle?

Al-Sulh answered: Rest assured. We have settled the matter and we will enter the battle united.

I want to say nothing about the effects of the Arab differences on the development of the Palestine issue because books have been written, studies published and facts and lies without discrimination have been broadcast on this aspect. I will be content with pointing out that the Arab axes caused loss of the opportunity to create the Palestinian state in 1947 when King 'Abdallah rejected the Palestinian National Council's meeting and the creation of the Government of All of Palestine in Gaza in the winter of 1948-49 which [lasted] until convocation of the Jericho

conference that changed the name of whatever remained of Palestine into the West Bank which was annexed to Trans-Jordan. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan rose as a result of this merger.

When the first military coup was staged in Syria in March 1949, Damascus--which had been vacillating between the Cairo-Riyadh axis and the Baghdad-Amman axis during the first presidency of the late Shukri al-Quwwatli--became the target of the new struggle which forgot the loss of Palestine to busy itself with the race for extending the influence to the capital of the Omayyads and the cradle of the Arab national thinking in the 20th century.

One of King 'Abdallah's, and perhaps of Prince 'Abd al-Ilah's, dreams was to realize what was known at the time as the Greater Syria plan. Even though this plan was branded as a British idea, history will prove that the first to fight it were the British because had the Arabs been able to carry it out and had an Arab state including the natural Syria (Syria and Jordan) and Iraq materialized at the time, the Israeli entity would not have been able to usurp Palestine and to establish its presence on it.

The Saudi-Hashimite conflict continued till after the assassination of King 'Abdallah in July 1951 and the downfall of King Faruq in July 1952, considering that the Egyptian revolutionary republican leadership inherited the political line which the monarchic Cairo had been following. As a result of liquidation of the British occupation in Egypt and Iraq, a new struggle erupted and focused on the question of linkage and alliance with the West or abidance by neutrality between the major camps. The Baghdad Charter or Pact came to divide the Arabs before the emergence of the national entities in many of the Arab countries, considering that the Arab League membership was still confined until then to the constituent members (Egypt, Iraq, the Kindom of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen). As far as I remember, only Libya joined the League in 1953 and Sudan in the wake of its independence in 1956.

The last manifestation of the confrontatinon between those two historical axes was that competition for unity and federation between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Iraq and Jordan on the other when the United Arab Republic came into existence to explode the Saudi-Egyptian alliance and the Hashimite union came into existence only to be shattered afterwards with the loss of the Iraqi throne. But the Egyptian-Syrian unity which seemed to have triumphed over the Baghdad-Amman axis did not gain the loyalty of either side. While losing the Saudi support which turned into hostility, this unity was confronted with Baghdad's retreat from its line of unity with the United Arab Republic and with the republican Iraq opposing Nasirism more violently and fiercely than the monarchic Iraq, the founding member of the Baghdad Pact!

If we notice that the era of the 1940's and 1950's was characterized by conflict between the monarchies and the conservative and traditional regimes, the era of the 1960's and 1970's became famous for the conflict between the revolutionary leaderships and regimes that raise resounding slogans which, surprisingly, may be the same on both sides of the conflict and which may even be the cause of limitless oneupmanship, bargaining and rivalry.

The first bitter conflict between two revolutions was the one which erupted between Cairo and Baghdad in the summer of 1958. It is one of the ironies of fate that the conflict started with disagreement over the relationship required to exist between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Iraq and whether it should be a relationship of merger unity or of federal union. The conflict did not come to an end until the United Arab Republic collapsed and the first Iraqi Republic fell!

A struggle of a new kind then emerged on the Arab arena between the revolutionary current led by Cairo and the conservative current led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the same time, regional disagreements and conflicts were spreading and flaring between the Arab states, one time because of border issues, another because of political inclinations and yet another because of personal dispositions.

What attracts attention is that until the early 1960's, the Arab conflicts were confined to the deterioration of political relations and the exchange of propaganda campaigns. But they then rapidly developed into military confrontations and the slogan of "the Arab weapon may not be directed at an Arab chest" was dropped to be replaced by the rule of: "The Arab weapons must be strengthened and increased to be used in the Arab confrontations."

The first tragedy of the Arabs' permitting of the shedding of each other's blood came with the eruption of the Moroccan-Algerian war into which Egypt slipped, sending its troops to assist Algeria in 1963 and then in the bloody development in Yemen after the Egyptian army entered it to support the revolution. The situation then turned into an Egyptian-Saudi confrontation which did not end until after the 1967 defeat.

There is no doubt that the ugliest consequence of the Arab conflicts is that they have opened the door wide for foreign influence at the expense of our land and our national existence, considering that some parties have not hesitated to seek the assistance of foreign countries or foreign forces against Arab states which also got involved in their relations with powers that have interests and ambitions. The example given us by the conflict between the Democratic Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman saves us the trouble of citing other examples on other Arab arenas.

There is no use in our going on with our review of the countless Arab confrontations with which the 1970's abounded. But it suffices us to pause before the tragic sight of the Syrian and Jordanian armies leaving their positions across Israel and turning to confront each other, allowing the Zionist entity to sleep peacefully and to rest assured and happy that the Arabs carry out the duty of fighting each other on behalf of Israel and to spare the blood of the Israeli army.

Perhaps the most serious and salient thing we conclude from our observation of the Arab conflicts is that these conflicts did not multiply, accumulate, deteriorate and exceed the limits of the reasonable in the relations and ties among the Arab countries until the shadow of colonialism receded from the Arab homeland and until the Arab national forces and elements took control of their countries which had been liberated from occupation. During their intransigent struggle against the colonialist influence, the leaderships of those forces were flying high the slogans of unity and Arabism.

We recall in this regard what happened between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen over 'Asir [province] in 1934 when the Saudi army invaded the kingdom of Imam Yahya ibn Hamid-al-Din to seize its cities and occupy the port of al-Hudaydah without providing the opportunity for any international intervention and without referring to the League of Nations. An Arab mediation was made at the time and succeeded in restoring matters to normalcy and in turning over that painful page in the relations of the two countries.

How is it then--now that we are in the last quarter of the 20th century, that we have more than 20 Arab states whose affairs are controlled by their citizens who carry out in them policies or programs in which they believe, or so they claim, which they have advocated and whose slogans they have raised--that we are launching against each other not only political or propaganda wars but military wars involving armies and bloodshed?

How can diplomatic relations between one Arab country and another be severed for the most trivial reasons whereas we knew no such innovation, which is new to our nation, in the 1950's and 1960's?

And for what is this happening on the Arab arena in a black and miserable phase to which the Arab history has witnessed no equal, except during the wars of the petty kings [in Spain] which opened the way for expelling Arabs and Islam from Andalusia in the middle of the 15th century?

We have written and warned frequently against permitting passage of the colonialist and Zionist schemes seeking to transform the Arabs as a nation in their land into what the American Indians have ended up with. Are the violent and widespread current Arab conflicts a part of these schemes and are they in implementation of these schemes?

Can the Arab leaders, whoever they are, not be aware that with their engaging in regional conflicts, they only serve the Zionist and colonialist goals, want it or not, and that their conflicts will reflect negatively not only on the entire Arab nation but also on their countries, their positions and their seats of power in particular?

Though I may have dwelt too long on recalling [past] sorrows, I may have delayed too long in answering the question: And what is to be done?

The constantly tense Arab conditions have raised this question ceaselessly and a lot has been said in answering it.

Perhaps one of the best solutions to get us out of the [illegible] in which we find ourselves is to turn to the Arab people and to make the [illegible] how the relations between our countries should be.

There is no doubt that the Arab citizen, whoever he is and in whatever geographic or leadership position he is found, rejects the mere idea of the possibility of conflict erupting between the Arab states in any manner, not to mention the transformation of such unjustifiable conflict into endless wars whose price is paid by the Arab nation in blood and resources and from its future.

When the entire Arab people are against any conflict between the Arab countries, then how can the leaders permit themselves to engage in such conflict? And doesn't it become our right to acknowledge that denying the Arab citizen the right to perform his political and national duties as a result of the absence of the democratic atmosphere has enabled individuals or groups who do not represent the people's will in what they do to make the wrong decision?

The democracy that will save the Arabs from their suffering is not the slogans and the actions that delay emendation of the fault but the means that elevates the people's word and that makes the citizen contribute in any manner and even to have an opinion in taking the position and in making the decision.

I am not enthusiastic to that call which emanated from Baghdad in the fall of 1946 for setting up a popular Arab league, considering that the activities of the popular and professional organizations have been distorted and that these organizations have become mere trumpets reiterating the voices of their ruling masters. I fear that the popular Arab league will be transformed into something similar to the well-known Arab unions and organizations.

But ultimately and in the face of the bitter reality under which we are living, I may find it impossible not to support those who advocate the holding of a popular conference to be attended by this nation's thinkers and opinion makers, in freedom from submission to any side and from blind and irresponsible alignment with any direction, so that they may declare the Arab people's word that condemns any position and rejects any decision leading to interfighting among the Arab states, to fragmenting the Arab capabilities and to division and aimlessness. We are in a fateful battle that requires us to forget everything except that our greater homeland with every part in it is facing the most dangerous challenges and is being exposed to the most terrible plots and that the evil will not be repelled and the plotters will not be stopped without restoration of the unity of our ranks even in its weakest form, namely that of Arab solidarity, until the cloud over our homeland clears, until this nightmare lying on our chests is lifted or until God does what He has willed.

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NO UNITY SEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT VIOLENCE

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Hafiz al-Barghuti: "Arab Relations Not Governed by Any Logic"]

[Text] AL-WATAN's dialogue in search of rational logic for the inter-Arab relations has decided to raise the question of "what is to be done." In my opinion, this question is misplaced because the search for a rational logic, as understood in AL-WATAN's call for dialogue, is not an absolute discussion but one that is tied to the present Arab reality. Consequently, the question of "what is to be done" is in fact a call for searching for a new reality different from the unbalanced present reality.

"What is to be done" is a search for a new reality and "what is the logic" is a search for a new method for managing the Arab relations of an existing Arab reality. This is why the discussions published so far have not provided an accurate answer and why the writers have been divided between searching for a rational logic and searching for a new reality. The result is that the rational logic has come tied to a new reality--and this is what was not wanted and what has been probably due to the fact that the question raised is not precise or is dual in nature.

This is why we have seen Dr Muhammad al-Rumayhi express the belief that it is necessary to agree on less disputable and controversial goals, i.e. to agree on the minimum limit. But this minimum limit requires regimes confident of their peoples, "meaning a new reality." Dr al-Rumayhi thus refutes, and rightly so, this vision of the rational logic.

This is also why we have seen Mr Tawfiq Abu-Bakr set as a precondition for discussing a rational logic for the Arab relations the introduction of a qualitative change in the relations of each country's political leadership with that country's masses. His logic thus applies to a new reality and not to an existing reality. Abu-Bakr has called for defining the means and instruments for moving from the strategy of position to the strategy of action. This can be realized only if a sound democratic atmosphere is present. This element, in addition to the qualitative change in the political leaderships' relations with their masses, is not available in the existing reality. They are two imaginary elements for an imaginary Arab reality.

This is also why we have seen Dr Isma'il Sabri Muqallid make proposals tied to the emergence of an Arab historic leadership and so forth. This is in addition to the other proposals made by the participants--proposals in which the reader has been lost in his search for a definite answer which he hasn't found because every participant has answered questions that are not clear to start with.

Because of all of this, we have seen Mr Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih jump clear over the question of searching for a rational logic to answer directly the question of what is to be done. Let Mr al-Salih permit me to make some observations on his answer because he has projected clearly a specific and clear-cut action program.

The program projected by Mr Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih is summed up in the view that "the required action is the unification that is realized only through democratic action, both politically and economically, which in its turn can be realized only if there is an Arab state with the power of polarization, namely Egypt which must be regained through the Arab people's support for the Egyptian people's vanguards who are leading the struggle inside Egypt.

A careful examination of this action program leads to these observations:

Unification or unity is an enormous accomplishment that can be realized with one means only, namely violence. With the sword were the Arabs united for the first time under Islam, with the force of arms was the United States established and with the force of arms was Germany united, as were Italy and the Soviet Union. There is no precedence of a unity realized through peaceful democratic action.

As for Egypt's departure and the need to bring it back, it can be said that Egypt has moved away not only from the Arabs but that its regime has dragged it into a camp hostile to the Arab nation so that it may perform a role that is no less dangerous, if not more dangerous, than that of Israel's. Had the Egyptian regime's departure from the conflict been a neutral departure, it would have been less harmful. But this has not been the case.

As for regaining Egypt by Arab popular support for the forces struggling inside Egypt, as Mr Muhammad Musa'id has said, this is some kind of a struggle utopia. Who will help whom? Where are the Arab people capable of supporting the Egyptian people? Is there an outstanding popular movement capable of performing this role? Of course not because the situation under which the masses in Egypt live is not much different from the situation of the Arab masses outside Egypt. Moreover, even though the Arab peoples succeeded in expelling colonialism from their lands with armed revolutions, they have failed to overthrow a single regime. Modern Arab history has recorded not a single such instance. The new attempt, namely and specifically the Lebanese popular revolution, was crushed brutally by some Arab regimes when it was about to top le the Lebanese regime with the force of arms because the success of this popular revolution would have constituted a serious precedent and a model worth imitating in the Arab area.

The question that must be raised is: How can the peoples regain Egypt? A popular revolution in Egypt, in case such a revolution erupts would be impossible to defeat from within or from outside for reasons that cannot be mentioned. But

are the forces struggling in Egypt at present and that are engaging in the struggle with one foot inside the regime and one outside it qualified to change the regime? And can the struggle be carried out openly under the eyes of the US, Israeli and Egyptian intelligence and under the shadow of an escalating US military presence?

Finally, the search for a rational logic for the irrational inter-Arab relations is tantamount to a seance to summon dead souls and this leads us to say that the Arab relations are not governed by any logic.

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REGIONAL, PAN-ARAB DEMOCRATIC FRONTS NEEDED

Kuwait Al-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Khalifah al-Khalifah: "Logic of Controversey Is Predominant"]

[Text] Like every reality, the Arab reality is controversial and analytical and the issues brought up by AL-WATAN's dialogue are numerous: Unity, fragmentation, progress, backwardness, liberation, capitulation, democracy, dictatorship, agreements and disagreements, firm and changing goals and the minimum limits and so forth. The entire issue is tied to the controversiality of the reality and to the dialectics of the desired progress. Dr al-Rumayhi put his scalpel on the tumor when he defined all of this. Unity lives with fragmentation, progress with backwardness, liberation with capitulation and democracy with dictatorship. Therefore, the forces must be separated and defined and it must be determined who will triumph and who will be defeated ultimately.

Arab "unity" yesterday, today and tomorrow is a controversial issue. How can it be the container of the movement of liberation and progress and what are its actual forces and their reserve assets? Who, exactly, are this unity's masses and who are its identified and objective enemies--both politically and in term of classes--in each Arab country and in its identified reality and who are they at the comprehensive level of all the countries? Under the reality of the cultural, political and economic backwardness and of the backwardness in the production relations and forces, the unity masses stand against this unity and fall victim of fragmentation. The 97 percent of the classes concerned with unity are the ones that create unity. Here emerges the issues of these classes' political education, class awareness and struggle solidarity and emerges the role of the factions of the progress and liberation movement. In Poland, labor sectors are standing against the working class party.

In the "democratic issue," who represents whom and who represents what? Who rules in whose name? If the goal is government of the people by the people and for the people, then what is the content [meaning] of democracy? When the fundamental issue connected with the conflict between capital and labor is excluded, what does democracy become? Here also emerges the controversy of the reality and the question of determining the democratic forces: Its supporters and its enemies. Who puts the eggs in the basket of democracy, who refuses to do so and what eggs get broken? The struggle for democracy is a reflection of the controversial reality and the conflict between its forces and classes. Yes, "thought is hunted like a mangy dog"

and physical liquidation, not to mention liquidation of the freedom of expression, must be stopped. Those who are the subject of liquidation are perhaps thinking of repaying the visit with counter liquidation.

"Liberation" and just causes polarize forces and touch off dynamic struggle with the least sacrifices. Palestine is a just cause. Zionism is tied to imperialism and the struggle against it is a political, ideological and economic struggle on the imperialist front. If we are a single nation, then which are the living nation's forces representing this nation? Are all, meaning all the brothers, for liberation and who puts his head with those of the fighters? Will the comprador and others fight for liberation? How and when? Here the international reality is reflected, at least let us say, more in this sphere than in others. Should we be subservient to imperialism and be a part of its "markets?" Should we be in conflict with imperialism or should we be "independent and neutral" when we are being exploited and occupied? Are we a part of the international liberation movement and do we want it with us or do we want to fight against it and against imperialism?

Thus, the search for a rational logic puts us face to face with the controversial reality. So that the picture may not be lost and the cards shuffled, we say that we are facing a phase of democratic national liberation that has its characteristics, requirements, forces and social intricacies. In each country, there are numerous factions of the democratic national liberation movement.

The start lies in establishing a democratic national front including these factions in each separate country in accordance with the program of the democratic national liberation phase: Equality of representation, democratic laws and legislations, development, class interests and abolition of the slogan of ruling and leading parties. The program can be realized through a democratic dialogue that may represent the minimum or maximum limit. At the level of all the countries, the national issue is embodied in establishing the democratic national and pan-Arab front that includes all the regional fronts of the democratic national liberation movements and that responds to the interests of the homeland and of the nation's masses.

Central Links

Also that the picture may not be lost, that the cards may not be shuffled and that certain regimes may not play their game with its deadend, it is required to know where we are placed by a comprehensive survey of the political, economic, population and ideological reality and its potentials and effects--both at the Arab and international levels--in realizing the goals of the Arab democratic national liberation movement. It is also required to know whether the Arab democrats focus their struggle in Beirut to set up the state of the "unionist and liberationist polarization" and whether there are dangers engulfing the future of a small Arab "national island," if it is destined to come into existence. It there a place for a small Arab Cuba, if we may use the expression? This is an extremely important issue, rather it is the big key and may truly be the beginning, as brother Muhammad Musa'id al-Salih has said. Where will Egypt be? This is the question. Where will the Arabs be? This also is the question.

Egypt is the issue of the democratic Arabs. For it to be the issue of the regimes, then different calculations are required. This is only because the Arab, democratic and liberationist Egypt will not serve many of the regimes and will change the Arab map. Therefore, the central link that puts the struggle in its more objective context and minimizes the losses on all fronts is the link of focusing on "breaking" the Egyptian regime's link. But breaking this link--and this is something that is determined primarily by the Egyptian democratic national movement and by the Arab democratic national movement generally--cannot be realized in isolation from but is rather tied to breaking, or perhaps weakening, other central and subsidiary links in the defeatist Arab reality, embodied in national and democratic victories in the various directions.

This linkage process is fundamental not only for bringing about the change but also for taking this change out of the vicious circle of some regimes that are outwardly in conflict with the Egyptian regime, perhaps not in the declared decisions that they adopt but in the reality under which they live.

The "rational" logic is present in the solidarity and conflicts of the regimes, in their alliances and wars, in their accomplishments and their lack of accomplishments, in their truth and falsehood, in their propaganda and liberationist bombardment, in the prosperity and poverty of their peoples and in the democratic or dictatorial quality of their conditions. All this has its negative and its positive aspects.

As for the other logic, it is the logic that puts the masses on the threshold of liberation and progress. It is the logic of conflict for unity and is the logic that will prevail.

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UNIFORM INSTITUTIONS CONSIDERED START FOR STRONGER RELATIONS

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Engineer Yahya al-Farra: "Arabs Have Become Like Hostile Brothers"]

[Text] Despite all this bitterness under which we live, despite all the torture we have suffered as Arab citizens, whether in the Arab East or in the Maghreb, and despite the fact that the question of what is to be done means that the problem is difficult, the solution to this problem is evident to every Arab. The solution is present and doesn't pose a problem theorectically. Let us start the answer with a question: Why has the Arab nation reached its present situation? The answer is because the Arab nation is almost about to become more than one nation. Instead of the fraternity that used to combine us, we are now more like enemies. Each faction is throwing the blame, the entire blame, on the other faction, accusing it of being the cause for the failure. The Egyptian says the reason for my starvation is the Palestine war, or so they have convinced him. The Syrian says the reason for my weakness is that Egypt has deserted me, and he is convinced of this. The Palestinian says the reason for my catastrophe and my problem are all the Arabs. The circle thus becomes complete, accusation prevails and confusion spreads.

If we wanted to discuss these matters, we would find that some of them are true. How can we say that we are a single Arab nation whose countries are the greater Arab homeland when the Arab cannot move from his country to any other [Arab] country? How can we say that we are a single Arab nation when we find in this nation nearly the highest and the lowest per capita income? How can we say that we are a single Arab nation when you find that there are those among us who specialize or are set aside for death and martyrdom and those who specialize or are singled out for tourism and prosperity? In all aspects, you find simultaneous contradictions.

Matters have reached the point of total estrangement and full and hot confrontation. The Arab armies stand facing each other and the Arab rulers have become two kinds of Arabs. All that has been and has not been mentioned has definitely led us to our present situation, thus giving rise to the big question of what is to be done.

Truly, what is to be done? The answer to this question is not difficult and the solution is not inaccessible and doesn't go beyond eliminating the differences in the Arab nation and giving the Arab citizen the full freedom to work, reside,

buy and sell and in all practical matters. For example, we must unify the academic curricula, beginning with kindergartens and up to university level, must unify the quality of textbooks and generalize the same standard of educational means, from the means of illustration to school furnishings and buildings, types of schools, school management and educational level. These fundamentals should not be different from country to country. We should not find that the educational level of the Kuwaiti child is different, for example, from that of the Sudanese or Yemeni child. The same goes for communication. We are not saying that the Syrian or the Sudanese has to use a [private] car for his transportation. But why aren't there in the Arab homeland somewhat comfortable means of communication and transportation? Why isn't the Arab homeland covered by an extensive network of modern highways and railroads with a somewhat uniform standard? The same goes for the other means of communication, such as telephones and other facilities.

The same also applies to trade and its relationship with economic integration, to banks, to insurance companies and to the establishment of joint-stock companies. The administrative and financial laws for all of them must be unified. The Arab armies, security agencies and similar institutions must be made as uniform as possible. Some may say that this is inaccessible and impossible and we remind whoever says this that if we are truly a single Arab nation, then this shouldn't be difficult or impossible.

Before the discovery of oil, Egypt undertook the responsibility, to a certain limit, for doing a lot of what we have mentioned. Now the responsibility of these demands falls on the shoulders of the Arab oil states. What prevents the Arab oil states from supervising and developing the Arab universities? What prevents the Arab oil states from adopting the issue of building road and railroad networks to cover all parts of the Arab homeland? What prevents developing the existing agricultural and industrial projects and introducing more such projects, with the oil states reserving for themselves the rights of maximum exploitation? We always hear of conferences being held and of studies being submitted from every direction on the matters we have and have not mentioned. But what has been put to implementation? Where has the issue of the Common Arab Market reached? Where have the joint defense agreements reached? The members of these conferences are not foreigners. They are, first and last, from among us and we know the reason for their desperate eagerness to be present in these conferences. The allowances, the luxury of trips and prestige have replaced the importance of the study presented and of discussion. When the selection for representation in these conferences is made on a sound basis, then the results will be sound and there will be followup on and implementation of what is agreed upon sincerely and faithfully.

As for the issue of regimes, it has bored the Arab citizen and has almost changed his character. The coups and the revolutions and all their statements and communiques which are filled with all the strange and dirty meanings [sic] that our language contains--these changes have led the Arab citizen to the point of indifference or even to the point of dissociation. There are those who have gone beyond this point (when iron is heated and cooled more than one time, its structure changes). What do you imagine the Arab citizen to be after all these coups from the extreme right to the extreme left, after all these social and cultural differences and after all this estrangement and alienation?

This is why if there were a law or a charter signed by all the Arab states not to recognize any new regime that comes into existence as the result of a military coup and even to renounce and fight such a regime one hundred percent, then I believe that this would give the present Arab ruler reassurance and would grant him the missing confidence.

There remains the individual and his important role. There also remains the role of the existing parties, be they religious, national or ideological. Parties continue to have the major and important role in enlightenment and in confronting the ruler through the constitutional means of parliaments, strikes, demonstrations and protests--all motivated by nothing other than the word of truth and all dissuaded by no fear.

The duty of the parties is a major duty. I don't believe that any party attracts members until it projects progressive slogans, beneficial slogans and constructive slogans. But we find that parties are like rulers. You find the Islamic parties striking and attacking the so-called progressive parties. What is more, you find the Islamic parties striking each other and the progressive parties lying in wait for the mistakes and slips of each other, casting doubts on each other and accusing each other of treason and loyalty and ties to foreign powers.

As long as the question of what is to be done has been raised, then these organizations must find a method to deal with each other. It was said in the past that religion belongs to God and the homeland belongs to all. The parties must find a slogan that sets a rule for dealing as long as we are in a phase in which our lands are occupied and as long as all the means of slander--such as the charges of backwardness, reaction and similar ones--are raised against us at the international level. These parties must channel all their energies toward building the responsible and vigilant partisan and must not allow the partisan's conduct among the masses to be that of the malicious and the desperate.

Finally, at the level of the Palestinian issue, which is our national cause, there has to be an approach agreed upon at the level of the Palestinian people's leadership and at the level of dealing with the Palestinian individual's living and struggle affairs. The Palestinian individual must be exempted from some restrictions, must be given the full opportunity to devote himself to his cause and we must not ask his leaderships to take aligned positions, threatening to cut off aid and to open propaganda wars against them if they don't. This must be replaced by aid that is free of all influences.

In conclusion, we, as an Arab nation, have all the means of success and we can realize this success if we provide the individual first and then the ruler with security, confidence and the freedom of expression. It is impossible for all of us to be progressive and it is impossible for all of us, whether at the top level, the base level or the level of parties, to be rightists. If this were the case, there would be no problem and the question of what is to be done would not have been raised.

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REVIVAL OF TRUE SPIRIT OF ARABISM ADVOCATED

Kuwait Al-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by 'Ali Hasanayn, Former Egyptian People's Assembly Member: "Isn't It Time for Us to Start Serious Step on Path"]

[Text] We all know our situation, know where we have reached and know many painful facts and live with them, insisting on living for our day only. The true Arab blood has gone. Has it disappeared from the veins of all of us? What blood do we carry? Has the warmth and genuineness of our blood become so dead? Where is the warm, strong, frank, honest and struggling blood? What has happened to us? We now live and see falsehood as right. All pictures are forged before our eyes and yet sweet words turn the counterfeit into original! The shape of everything from top to bottom is changed to suit falsehood and yet we accept and condone the change. Till when, now that we have reached the abyss?

Each is in a valley and moves away from the truth, either ignorantly or intentionally. We have become the professors of words in the press, in the broadcasting stations and in meetings and symposiums. What has befallen us? Shouldn't we wake up and map out our path and our method?

We must understand the truth so that we may face it in every place, site and country and must not bury our heads in sand and dirt.

The entire world is looking at us maliciously, is plundering and exploiting us and is luring our leaderships, our philosophers and many of us. We have no life without true dignity and honor.

Our Arabism is bigger, greater and more sacred than we are led to believe.

Our independence and our information are worthless as long as we accept the well-phrased and honeyed words given to us at the international level when our rights are clear.

We must beat the drums of everything everywhere. We must beat the drums strongly and violently and with arms in which Arab blood flows and which are accompanied with money, life and blood and not just with words and slogans.

Our Arabism is not a transient thing that is affected by the thoughts, action or conduct of our rulers. It is our life and our future. We must make all realize that our unity is bigger than their actions. Let friendship and charity dwell among us, let us forget our regional nationalities and let our hearts be big enough to teach everyone that Arabism is bigger than his money and will safeguard and protect him, that Arabism is bigger than his poverty and will aid and assist him and that Arabism is bigger than America and Europe (which will have no mercy on him). Here lies his fate and his end--he and his Arab kinsmen and brothers. Let us teach everyone that his brother and his kinsman, and not the foreigner, is his support and let us emerge to the world with our Arabism and not import our Arabism from the world.

Our values, customs and divine constitution have taught us a lot and have even outlined the entire path for us.

All we have to do is to gather, strengthen and bolster the ranks and remind them of their Arabism, religion and sacred values. This is the responsibility of those who are capable materially, morally and spiritually. Rather, it is the responsibility of the entire Arab people from their ocean to their Gulf. Where are the free and faithful Arabs? Let them make the change themselves and God lead us to His right path.

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DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF ACTION REQUIRED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Adib Husayn: "Creating Democratic Atmosphere First"]

[Text] The "search for a rational logic for the Arab relations" is an important issue brought up by the esteemed AL-WATAN in a critical phase of the Arab nation's life when interfighting, oppression and suppression have become an outstanding characteristic of the Arab homeland and when the Zionist enemy is controlling an important part of the Arab homeland's territories.

When searching for a rational logic for the Arab relations, the Palestinian issue has to be brought up as one of the fundamental issues with which the Arab regimes have been tested and through which they have proven indisputably that there exists among them no national bond with which to counter the Zionist invasion that is expanding day after day and which has been able to invade some [states] economically, culturally and politically, though it has not imposed its military control on them by occupying their territories.

Since its first conference in Basel in 1897, the Zionist movement has been able to turn the dream of setting up a Jewish homeland in Palestine into a reality and to gather the hated and outcast Jews in armed military battalions which have established the State of Israel with force.

The Arab regimes have been content with holding conferences here and there and with countless joint communiques in which the Palestinian issue has had the lion's share, but with all action suspended.

In the first communique of every [Arab] revolution, the Palestinian tragedy has always lived in the conscience of the free officers who have never been able to put up with injustice!

The Palestinian issue also occupied a part of the Arab leaders' interests in the 1950's and 1960's and the slogans of liberating Palestine and of Arab unity were raised. There was the slogan of "liberating Palestine is the path to unity and unity is the path to Palestine." There was even the more revolutionary slogan saying that Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary goals. The days and the years have passed and neither Palestine has been liberated nor unity realized. Rather, whatever remained of the Palestinian territories have fallen into Jewish hands!

Let us go back to the days when the Arab nation was living under the shadow of the Ottoman colonialism and then of the British, French and Italian colonialism and when the bond of struggle and blood existed between the Arabs of the East and those of the Maghreb and between the Egyptian Arabs and the Syrian Arabs, as if they were all one body. The liberation movements and the underground organizations coordinated with one another and formulated common plans to confront the occupation forces. They were united by the banner which only the Arab Palestinian resistance flies nowadays. What is required is to create the free and democratic atmosphere for every citizen to perform his duty without fear or coercion. It is also required that the fawning elements that flatter the rulers be removed because a friend is the one who befriends you and not the one who believes you. It is required that the world be addressed with the tongue of the strong who is in the right and not with the tongue of the victimized weak.

It is also required that the principle of reciprocal treatment in foreign dealings be adopted and that summit resolutions be observed. It is true that not every change is made overnight. But let us start because the 1,000-mile road begins with one step.

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DEMOCRATIZATION OF INDI' 'D' AL, SPIRIT OF TR'ST URGED AS BEGINNINGS

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 15

[Article by 'Isam al-Jamal: "Elimination of Fear Is Basis"]

[Text] I want to tackle the issue of "what is to be done" differently and with an approach that may seem naive because of its simplicity. But perhaps this approach is the appropriate one for this issue because of the simple reasons and factors governing the Arab world and leading us to our present situation.

Moreover, an article that steers clear of the dialectical bases and of the use of such expressions as 'technocracy and bourgeoisie' conveys the view to broader factions.

I ask: Why don't we tackle the issue from the angle of totalities and make our conclusions?

In 1962, in June specifically, and during the preparation for the first Arab Common Market agreement, a prominent Arab economist who occupied the position of minister here and whose turn it was to speak after the Libyan minister of economy and after Dr Muhammad Fu'ad Ibrahim, the head of the Cairo University Business Management Section at the time and Egypt's representative to the conference to lay down the market's foundations--this prominent Arab economist who occupied the position of minister here said: I am not prepared to approve the transformation of this market's concept into a reality. How can I, as a Kuwaiti merchant, compete with the Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian and Lebanese merchant if they are all permitted to be next to me in accordance with the market agreement? This is how the Arab Common Market was understood in 1962.

Shortly afterwards, we were within the delegation to inaugurate the first Kuwaiti air route with a fraternal Arab country. We spent 4 hours at the airport before being permitted to enter [the fraternal country]. We were then notified that our passports had been handed over to the intelligence authorities and that each of us had to collect his passport before departing.

The call for Arab unity was at its height at the time, this country was one of the important mainstays of this unity and the first word of its raised slogan was "unity..."

In the summer of the same year, the passports officer on the Lebanese borders turned me back to Damascus so that my embassy may add to my passport the words: Permitted to enter Lebanon. This meant that Lebanon had no objection to my entry but that Egypt had to include the name of Lebanon with those listed in the passport.

Why, officer?

He said: So that I may feel that Egypt respects Lebanon! Like that.

At a session last summer in a casino overlooking Alexandria's shore--a session which included prominent authors Tawfiq al-Hakim, Najib Mahfuz, the vice president of Alexandria University, Tharwat Abazah, the man in charge of AL-AHRAM's cultural page, and a select group of Egyptian men of letters and journalists, as well as the top commentator in Radio Israel, this commentator said:

"When an Egyptian delegation comes to us in Israel, we conceal nothing from it. If the delegation asks to meet with the prime minister, we give it the opportunity immediately. Moreover, we hide no facts in our democratic system. We present everything clearly to the people and to the entire world, and especially to our people.

"But we feel no trace of your democracy here in Egypt. The facts are half revealed and what the government wants finds its way to publication and discussion and what the government doesn't want discussed is known to us in Israel but not to your citizens. Moreover, any delegation coming to you from Israel finds itself lost in labyrinths. Even regarding some provisions of the Camp David accord--provisions on which the decision has been postponed--you make announcements that make it sound as if agreement has been reached. Why this contradiction that plants doubt and obstructs the peace procession?"

Answers poured down on the top radio commentator in Israel and all of them were characterized by those qualities for which the commentator had criticized the general situation in the country.

If we stop telling tales to determine the reasons for the condition that we have reached, we find that they lie, very briefly and poignantly, in the following:

When the Arab states achieved independence from military colonialism, they had to face another kind of struggle--a struggle between the people and the government which had cooperated with or had been in truce with colonialism and which inherited from it prestige, influence and power.

The struggle thus became a struggle between the crushed popular base and the priviliged class.

When the revolutions erupted, either for independence, as in the case of Algeria, or to get rid of the traditional ruler, the dreams and aspirations of the revolutionary command councils required qualified cadres and economic resources in order to be realized. Neither was available and so the situation turned into struggle for power among members of the new government and even into a struggle between these members and the people.

When the winds of revolutionary coups rose, the Arab world became divided into two camps: a camp viewing the coup states as a danger to its regimes and a camp viewing the truce with these regimes as a guarantee for holding the stick right down the middle, thus confronting the revolutionary states with the danger of the so-called "reactionary" states and refraining, at the same time, from angering these traditional states.

Amidst this struggle and while the western world had departed with its troops and started to build itself with the foreign agreements it had concluded, we were paying the costs of this western world's development.

At that particular phase, 'Abd-al-Nasir's voice was the loudest. 'Abd-al-Nasir's call proceeded along two axes: An external axis with which to create an issue, namely the Palestine issue, by virtue of which the call for Arab unity is realized and an internal axis with which to try not to lead the relationship between the people and the government to the same differences existing in King Faruq's days. 'Abd-al-Nasir faced three dilemmas:

First dilemma: The barking [clamor] of the world with a traditional fear of the unity of the Arab world or of the Islamic world.

Second dilemma: An easy accusation--namely that of communism--which the traditional states were able to direct against him when he projected socialism as a system of action and building, especially as a result of his full cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Third dilemma: The accusation that he aspired to rule the entire Arab world and to become the modern communist caliph.

Even though 'Abd-al-Nasir's march realized an international place for the Arabs, it awakened Israel from its (hiberation) and intensified the West's interest in and planning for obstruction of the nation's cohesion. This march also created in the Egyptian citizen in particular and in the Arab citizen generally aspirations that could not be realized by the economic resources or by the various cultural, social and cultural institutions.

'Abd-al-Nasir awakened the "defeated hero" in the Arab citizen from Lebanon to Yemen but has found nobody to adopt, develop and carry on with his goals.

The final reason is Camp David which came after disappearance of the opponent [sic] over which we struggled, either supporting or opposing this opponent. Arab nationalism was this opponent and the struggle over it was most like a struggle with a divine creed. When this opponent disappeared or nearly disappeared, a period of relaxation followed. During this period, the Camp David procession came into existence and upturned all criteria, especially since the [Arab] states allied with the West, those allied with the East and the PLO, the Palestinian people's representative, were all perplexed and perplexing, not knowing what to do.

Amidst all this, the Arab citizen is preoccupied with earning his living or with developing his personal interests and ambitions, thus losing his feeling for the group, for the land, for the homeland and for the nation--and believe me.

The work to free ourselves of all of this doesn't start from top to bottom but vice versa. Let us face the reality with all its bitterness and with utter honesty at all levels, first in each country separately.

Let the state begin with the individual. For example, a society will not apply true democracy if the people themselves are incapable of dealing with democracy. Democracy is both theory and practice. What happens is that this democracy is projected in one manner or another but that the Arab individual has not reached the cultural level that enables him to understand the difference between conflict and disagreement with the ruler.

It is also required that we move away from superficiality. I do not see or hear in the world such glorification of the ruler and so many celebrations on national occasions as there are in the Arab world.

How can the spirit of trust be established among the Arab states and be reflected on the Arab citizen, on his movement from one country to another and on his dealings with these countries? The representative of a foreign firm comes to an Arab country only to stay at the most luxurious hotels, to be introduced to the head of state respectfully and to meet with members of the board of directors respectfully whereas the Arab businessman has to knock the doors like a beggar, why?

Regarding action, the latest summit's sudden interest in preparing to deal with the international economic crisis is timely and opportune. But all the danger lies in the fact that the resolutions, like the resolutions of all the previous summits, will turn into ink on paper and will not be implemented, not because of illwill but because the receiving executive channels are not prepared. Consequently, the resolutions will be lost in files and will not reach the stage of implementation.

One of the necessary steps of action on the Arab arena is the step of stopping the policy of trial and error. We either plan through the planning councils, which have failed in the entire Arab world, and abide by our plans or start where the West has reached and follow in its footsteps.

There remains a fact followed by a question:

The fact is that economy is politics and politics is an economy insofar as building the backgone of nations, is concerned. The talk about the availability of capital, raw materials and the workforce necessary for the Arab homeland is old.

The question is: Can we separate the economic action as a goal from the political differences?

Thus, the action lies in all of this: In confronting the individual with his society's problems, in making him responsible for the solution, in remoteness from superficiality, in tying the various parts of the nation with economic interests and in understanding that the slogans of democracy require people who are up to the standard of dealing with them.

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ARABS URGED TO RENOUNCE PARTISAN SLOGANS, CLING TO ARABISM, ISLAM

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Dec 80 p 15

[Article by Ibrahim Ya'qub al-Hajiri: "Peoples First"]

[Text] There have been conflicting views regarding the search for a rational logic for the Arab nation's relations. Most of the views have focused on the quality of government and on its various systems, which is something that has caused consta t differences among the countries of our Arab homeland. Even though I am not a writer, I can say that some rulers are not to be blamed if they follow in their rule methods that do not please their peoples or the other Arab peoples. I say that our peoples were exposed by colonialism to brainwashing after World War II. Afterwards, colonialism divided the Arab homeland into mini-states and injected the peoples with slogans that have nothing to do with our Arabism, namely with communism, socialism, Ba'thism, (al-harakiyah) [presumably meaning the Arab Nationalist Movement], the Muslim Brotherhood, the traditionalists and others. If we renounce these slogans, go back to our Arab history and cling to our Islamic religion, then we would unite as the United States has united.

I again say that colonialism is the side that fears the rise of a united Arab nation and that colonialism is the side that has exploited our naivete and focused on the policy of divide to rule. This is an appeal to our Arab people to regain their senses and to make the path to their strength the divine wisdom saying "and do not be divided because you will fail and your strength will be lost." We hope that the Islamic conference which will be held in the venerable Mecca next month will produce positive resolutions from which our Arab nation will benefit, and this is not difficult for God.

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